Swarm Formal Specification

Swarm Research Division

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Chapter 1

Formal specification

DISC basics 1.1

1.1.1 Notation

- roman predicates standing for blockchain verifiable properties
- SMALLCAPS—field of a composite, tuple member function
- Π^p proof constructor function
- \mathbb{V}^p validator function
- TT_FONT constant parameter (see appendix ??)
- uint[d] left closed, right open integer range $\overline{[0,2^d)}$

Sequences 1.1.2

Definition 1 – sequences.

Define $\tau\{n\}$, the non-polymorphic sequences of length n (non-negative) over any type τ as an indexing function:

$$\tau\{n\} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} \varnothing & \text{if } n = 0\\ \overline{0, n - 1} \to \tau & \text{if } n > 0 \end{cases}$$

$$\tau + \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \bigcup_{n \in \mathbb{Z}^+} \tau\{n\} \tag{1.2}$$

$$\tau * \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{\varnothing\} \cup \tau + \tag{1.3}$$

$$\tau + \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \bigcup_{n \in \mathbb{Z}^+} \tau\{n\} \tag{1.2}$$

$$\tau * \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{\varnothing\} \cup \tau + \tag{1.3}$$

(1.4)

Length function *len*:

$$len(s) : \tau \to uint64$$
 (1.5)

$$len(s) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } s = \emptyset \\ n & \text{if } s \in \tau\{n\} \end{cases}$$
 (1.6)

The positional index 'at' function:

$$[] : \tau * \to \times uint64 \to \tau \tag{1.7}$$

[] :
$$\tau * \to \times uint64 \to \tau$$
 (1.7)
 s [] : $\overline{0, len(s) - 1} \to \tau$ (1.8)

$$s[i] \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} s'(i) \tag{1.9}$$

Define the *concatenation* operator ' \oplus ':

$$(x \oplus y) : \overline{0, len(x) + len(y) - 1} \to \tau$$
 (1.10)

$$(x \oplus y) : \overline{0, len(x) + len(y) - 1} \to \tau$$

$$(x \oplus y)[i] \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} x[i] & \text{if } 0 \le i < len(x) \\ y[i - len(x)] & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$(1.10)$$

Define slices (subsequences) with the range operator ':':

$$(s[o:o+l])$$
 : $\overline{0,l-1} \to \tau$ (1.12)

$$(s[o:o+l])[i] \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} s[o+i] \tag{1.13}$$

where

$$o, l \ge 0 \land \tag{1.14}$$

$$len(x) \ge o + l \tag{1.15}$$

Let us also define empty, prefix and suffix slices:

$$s[x:x] \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \varnothing \tag{1.16}$$

$$s[:x] \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} s[0:x] \tag{1.17}$$

$$s[x:] \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} s[x:len(s)] \tag{1.18}$$

As a special case byte slices are defined as sequences of 8-bit integers.

Definition 2 – segmentation.

Define segment as an at most 32 long byte slice, and define segmentation of a slice of bytes as the partitioning of the slice into consecutive segments. Define segment count as the number of segments that cover a byte slice:

$$SegCnt : byte* \rightarrow uint64$$
 (1.19)

$$SegCnt(s) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} int\left(\frac{len(s)-1}{32}\right) + 1$$
 (1.20)

Now we can define the segment indexing function [[]] which maps the byte slice s and an index i to the i-the segment in the segmentation of s:

$$[[]] : byte* \rightarrow uint64 \rightarrow Segment$$
 (1.21)

$$s[[]] : \overline{0, SegCnt(s) - 1} \rightarrow Segment$$
 (1.22)

$$s[[i]] : \frac{sget + anosq}{0, SegCnt(s) - 1} \rightarrow Segment$$

$$s[[i]] \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} s[32 \cdot i:] & \text{if } i = SegCnt - 1 \\ s[32 \cdot i:32 \cdot (i+1)] & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$(1.22)$$

1.1.3 Custom types

Definition 3 – Swarm overlay address of node n.

A Swarm node is associated with an Ethereum account that the node operator must possess the private key for, called bzz account (K_n^{bzz}) . The node's overlay address is derived as the hash of the binary serialisation of the Ethereum address of this account with the Swarm network ID and a minable nonce appended.

$$overlay(n) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} H(acc \oplus id \oplus \nu)$$
 (1.24)

where

ETH ADDRESS
$$acc = Account(K_n)$$
 (1.25)

NETWORK ID
$$id = BZZ_NETWORK_ID$$
 (1.26)

OVERLAY NONCE
$$\nu \in Nonce$$
 (1.27)

Definition 4 – DISC custom types.

Let us define the DISC specific custom types used in the formalisation.

 $Segment \equiv byte\{32\} \equiv uint256$

32-long slice of raw bytes

in numerical context cast as BigEndian encoded 256-bit unsigned integer

 $Address \equiv Segment$

swarm chunk address, swarm peers' overlay address

 $Nonce \equiv Segment$

deterministically random Segment

 $Account \equiv byte\{20\}$

Ethereum address deriveed from EC keypair K

 $Account(K) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} H(PubKey(K))$ [12:32]

 $Nodes \equiv Segment$

swarm client node (peer)

 $Sig \equiv byte\{65\}$

 $\langle r, s, v \rangle$ representation of an EC signature (32+32+1 bytes)

 $Timestamp \equiv uint64$

64-bit unsigned integer for unix time, nanosecond resolution

big endian binary serialisation.

 $H: byte* \rightarrow Segment$

the 256-bit Keccak SHA3 hash function, the base hash used in swarm.

1.1.4 XOR distance and proximity order

Definition 5 – XOR distance (χ) .

Consider the set of bit sequences with fixed length d as points in a space. Define a distance metric χ such that the distance between two such sequences is the numerical value of their bitwise XOR (^) using big endian (= most significant bit first) encoding.

$$\chi : uint[d] \times uint[d] \rightarrow uint[d]$$
(1.28)

$$\chi(x,y) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} Uint^d(BE^d(x)^{\wedge}BE^d(x))) \tag{1.29}$$

Given the fixed length d > 0, there is a maximum distance $(2^d - 1 = \chi(0\{d\}, 1\{d\}))$ in this space, and thus we can define the notion of normalised distance:

$$\overline{\chi} : uint[d] \times uint[d] \to \mathbb{Q}[0,1]$$
 (1.30)

$$\overline{\chi}(x,y) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \frac{\chi(x,y)}{2^d-1}$$
 (1.31)

Definition 6 – Proximity order (PO).

Proximity order (PO) is a discrete logarithmic scaling of proximity.

$$PO : uint[d] \times uint[d] \rightarrow \overline{0, d}$$
 (1.32)

$$PO(x,y) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} d & \text{if } x = y \\ int(\log_2(Proximity(x,y))) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$
 (1.33)

where proximity is the inverse of normalised distance:

Proximity :
$$uint[d] \times uint[d] \rightarrow uint[d]$$
 (1.34)

$$Proximity(x,y) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \frac{1}{\overline{\chi}(x,y)}$$
 (1.35)

Given two points x and y, the order of their proximity PO(x, y) equals the number of initial bits shared by their respective most significant bit first binary representations. In practice, with d = 256, $uint[d] \equiv Segment$, so PO also applies to a pair of slices of 32 bytes.

1.1.5 Binary Merkle tree hash




Figure 1.1: BMT (Binary Merkle Tree) used as the native chunk hash in Swarm. In this example, 1337 bytes of chunk data is segmented into 32 byte segments. Zero padding is used to fill up the rest up to 4 kilobytes. Pairs of segments are hashed together using the ethereum-native Keccak256 hash to build up the binary tree. On level 8, the binary Merkle root is prepended with the 8 byte span and hashed to yield the BMT chunk hash.

The BMT chunk address is the hash of the 8 byte metadata (span) and the root hash of a binary Merkle tree (BMT) built on the 32-byte segments of the underlying data (see figure 1.1). If the chunk content is less than 4k, the hash is calculated as if the chunk was padded with all zeros up to 4096 bytes.

Definition 7 - Binary Merkle Tree Root.

Define $\triangle[H, n](i, d)$ as the Binary Merkle Tree Root of data d fitting in at most 2^n 32-byte

segments using H as its base hash:

$$\triangle$$
: $(byte* \rightarrow Segment) \times uint8 \rightarrow uint8 \times byte* \rightarrow Segment$ (1.36)

$$\triangle[H, n] = : \overline{0, n} \times byte\{, 2^n\} \to Segment$$
 (1.37)

$$\triangle[H, n](i, d) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} d & \text{if } i = 0\\ \triangle[H, n](i, d \oplus 0\{2^{n+5} - len(d)\}) & \text{if } len(d) < 2^{i+5}\\ H(\triangle[H, n](d [: 2^{i-1}], i - 1) \oplus\\ \oplus \triangle[H, n](d [2^{i-1}:], i - 1)) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$
(1.38)

Definition 8 – Binary Merkle Tree Hash.

Define BMT[H](d, m) as the hash of Binary Merkle Tree Root of chunk length data d prepended with metadata m. H is the base hash function, by default 256-bit Keccak. Note that a chunk size blob of bytes can accommodate 128 32-byte segments, hence depth 7:

$$BMT$$
: $(byte* \rightarrow Segment) \rightarrow Chunk \times byte\{8\} \rightarrow Segment$ (1.39)

$$BMT[H]$$
: $Chunk \times byte\{8\} \rightarrow Segment$ (1.40)

$$BMT[H](d,m) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} H(m \oplus \triangle[H,7](7,d)) \tag{1.41}$$

1.1.6 Chunks

Definition 9 – Content addressed chunks.

Define content address chunk c as a function from bytes data with size limit of 4096 bytes and an associated address calculated with BMT:

$$CAC$$
: $Chunk \times byte\{8\} \rightarrow Chunks$ (1.42)

$$CAC(d, m) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \langle addr, cont \rangle$$
 (1.43)

such that

$$addr \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} BMT(d, m) \tag{1.44}$$

$$cont \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} m \oplus d \tag{1.45}$$

By convention the metadata prefix m encodes the span using 64-bit little endian. If the chunk is an intermediate chunk (see definition 11), the span is the length of the data that the subtree spans over. If the chunk is a data chunk, then span encodes the data length:

$$m \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} LE^{64}(len(d)) \tag{1.46}$$

We also say that for $cac = CAC(d, m) = \langle addr, cont \rangle$:

$$ADDRESS(cac) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} addr \tag{1.47}$$

$$PAYLOAD(cac) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} cont \tag{1.48}$$

$$DATA(cac) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} d \tag{1.49}$$

$$METADATA(cac) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} m \tag{1.50}$$

For convenience SegCnt and the segment indexing function '[[]]' can be trivially extended to apply to chunks:

$$SegCnt : Chunks \rightarrow uint64$$
 (1.51)

$$SegCnt(c) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} SegCnt(DATA(c))$$
 (1.52)

$$[[]] : Chunks \times uint64 \rightarrow Segment$$
 (1.53)

$$c[[i]] \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{DATA}(c)[[i]]$$
 (1.54)

1.1.7 Single Owner Chunks

Definition 10 – Single owner chunks.

A single owner chunk is defined as a content addressed chunk associated with an ID and an ethereum address:

$$SOC \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} Account \times Segment \times CAC \rightarrow Chunks$$
 (1.55)

$$SOC(owner, id, cac) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \langle addr, cont \rangle$$
 (1.56)

where

$$addr \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} H(o \oplus id) \tag{1.57}$$

$$cont \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} id \oplus Sig(o, id \oplus \text{Address}(cac)) \oplus \text{Payload}(cac)$$
 (1.58)

A single owner chunk's address is the Keccak256 hash of identifier prepended to owner account, while its data is serialised as follows:

- identifier 32 bytes arbitrary identifier,
- signature 65 bytes $\langle r, s, v \rangle$ representation of an EC signature (32+32+1 bytes),

- span 8 byte little endian binary of uint64 chunk span,
- data max 4096 bytes of regular chunk data.

Integrity of a single owner chunk is verified with the following process:

- 1. Deservative the chunk content into fields for identifier, signature and payload.
- 2. Construct the expected plaintext composed of the identifier and the BMT hash of the payload.
- 3. Recover the owner's address from the signature using the plaintext.
- 4. Check the hash of the identifier and the owner (expected address) against the chunk address.

Definition 11 - Packed address chunk.

Define the packed address chunk for a sequence of chunks C as the concatenation of all the addresses of the chunks in the sequence:

$$PAC : Chunks* \times byte\{8\} \rightarrow Chunks$$
 (1.59)

$$PAC$$
: $Chunks* \times byte\{8\} \rightarrow Chunks$ (1.59)
 $PAC(C, m) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} CAC\left(\bigoplus_{i=0}^{len(C)-1} Address(C[i]), m\right)$ (1.60)

1.1.8 Segment inclusion proofs

Using BMT hashes allows for compact segment inclusion proofs (substring relationship with a 32-byte resolution).

Definition 12 - BMT segment inclusion proof.

Define $\Pi^{SIP}(c,i)$ as the BMT inclusion proof on chunk c for segment index i:

$$\Pi^{\text{SIP}}$$
: $Chunks \times \overline{0,127} \to SIP$ (1.61)

$$SIP \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} Segment \times Segment^7 \times byte\{8\}$$
 (1.62)

$$\Pi^{\text{SIP}}(c,i) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \langle c[[i]], \langle h_0, h_1, \dots, h_6 \rangle, \text{METADATA}(c) \rangle$$
(1.63)

where

$$h_j \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} BMT(s_j, j) \tag{1.64}$$

$$s_j \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} c[start(i,j): start(i,j) + 32 \cdot 2^j]$$

$$(1.65)$$

where

$$start(i,j) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } j = 7\\ start(i,j+1) & \text{if } int (i/2^j) = 0 \mod 2\\ start(i,j+1) + 32 \cdot 2^j & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$
 (1.66)




Figure 1.2: Compact segment inclusion proofs for chunks. Assume we need proof for segment 26 of a chunk (yellow). The orange hashes of the BMT are the sister nodes on the path from the data segment up to the root and constitute what needs to be part of a proof. When these are provided together with the root hash and the segment index, the proof can be verified. The side on which proof item i needs to be applied depends on the i-th bit (starting from least significant) of the binary representation of the index. Finally the span is prepended and the resulting hash should match the chunk root hash.

In order to validate segment inclusion proofs we first introduce the prover hash function H_{Π} .

Definition 13 - BMT prover function.

$$H_{\Pi}$$
: $\overline{0,127} \times SIP \rightarrow Address$ (1.67)

$$H_{\Pi}(i, \langle d, sisters, m \rangle) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} H(m, H_{\Pi}^{\triangle}(7, d, sisters))$$
 (1.68)

where

$$H_{\Pi}^{\triangle} : \overline{0,7} \times Segment \times Segment^7 \to Address$$
 (1.69)

$$H_{\Pi}^{\triangle}(j,d,s) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} d & \text{if } j = 0 \\ H(H_{\Pi}^{\triangle}(j-1,d,s) \oplus s [j-1]) & \text{if } int(i/2^{j-1}) = 0 \mod 2 \pmod 2 \\ H(s[j-1] \oplus H_{\Pi}^{\triangle}(j-1,d,s)) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Definition 14 - BMT SIP validation.

Define $\mathbb{V}^{\text{SIP}}(a,i,p)$ as the validator of a BMT segment inclusion proof p for chunk at address a on segment index i:

$$\mathbb{V}^{\text{SIP}}$$
: $Segment \times \overline{0,127} \times SIP \to \{\mathtt{T},\mathtt{F}\}$ (1.71)

$$\mathbb{V}^{\text{SIP}} : Segment \times \overline{0,127} \times SIP \to \{\mathtt{T},\mathtt{F}\}$$

$$\mathbb{V}^{\text{SIP}}(a,i,p) \Leftrightarrow H_{\Pi}(i,p) = a$$

$$(1.71)$$

Definition 15 – Single owner chunks data integrity proof.

Define a single owner chunk storage proof $\Pi^{\text{soc}}(c,i)$ as a segment inclusion proof of the data payload of SOC c on index i together with the ID and signature of SOC c:

$$SIP_{SOC} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} SIP \times Sig \times Segment$$
 (1.73)
 $\Pi^{\text{SIP[SOC]}} : SOC \times \overline{0,127} \rightarrow SIP_{SOC}$ (1.74)

$$\Pi^{\text{SIP[SOC]}} : SOC \times \overline{0,127} \rightarrow SIP_{SOC}$$
 (1.74)

$$\Pi^{\text{SIP[SOC]}}(\langle o, id, cac \rangle, i) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \langle p, sig, id \rangle$$
(1.75)

where

$$p = \Pi^{SIP}(cac, i) \tag{1.76}$$

$$sig = Sig(o, id \oplus address(cac))$$
 (1.77)

Definition 16 - Single owner chunks data integrity validation.

Define $\mathbb{V}^{\text{SIP[SOC]}}(a,i,p)$ as the validator of a single owner chunk storage proof p for chunk at address a on segment index i:

$$\mathbb{V}^{\text{SIP[SOC]}} \quad : \quad Address \times \overline{0,127} \times SIP_{SOC} \rightarrow \{\texttt{T,F}\} \tag{1.78}$$

$$\mathbb{V}^{\text{SIP[SOC]}}(a, i, \langle p, sig, id \rangle) \Leftrightarrow a = H(id \oplus o)$$

$$(1.79)$$

such that

OWNER
$$o = ECRecover(siq, id \oplus a')$$
 (1.80)

PAYLOAD
$$a' = H_{\Pi}(i, p)$$
 (1.81)

1.1.9 Postage stamps

Definition 17 - Postage stamps.

$$Stamps \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} Segment \times uint64 \times Timestamp \times Address$$
 (1.82)

$$ps = \langle b, i, ts, a \rangle \in Stamps$$
 (1.83)

$$BATCHID(ps) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} b \tag{1.84}$$

$$INDEX(ps) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} i \tag{1.85}$$

$$TIMESTAMP(ps) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} ts \tag{1.86}$$

$$ADDRESS(ps) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} a \tag{1.87}$$

Definition 18 - Storage slot reference.

Define the storage slot reference slot(ps) of a postage stamp ps as the tuple of the batch identifier and the within-batch stamp counter:

$$Slots \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} Segment \times uint64$$
 (1.88)

$$slot : Stamps \rightarrow Slots$$
 (1.89)

$$slot(ps) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \langle \text{BATCHID}(ps), \text{INDEX}(ps) \rangle$$
 (1.90)

Definition 19 - Postage stamp validity.

Define $\mathbb{V}^{\text{STAMP}}(ps)$ as the validator of the proof of relevance expressed as the postage stamp ps relying on blockchain information:

$$\mathbb{V}^{\text{STAMP}} : Stamps \times \Gamma \times Nodes \rightarrow \{\mathsf{T}, \mathsf{F}\}$$
 (1.91)

$$\mathbb{V}^{\text{STAMP}}(ps, \gamma, n) \Leftrightarrow \tag{1.92}$$

AUTHENTIC BATCHID
$$(ps) \in \text{Batches}(\gamma) \land$$
 (1.93)

ALIVE Balance
$$(ps) > 0 \land$$
 (1.94)

AUTHORISED
$$ECRecover(Sig(ps), encode(ps)) = Owner(ps) \land (1.95)$$

AVAILABLE
$$0 \le \text{INDEX}(ps) < \text{Size}(ps) \land$$
 (1.96)

ALIGNED
$$PO(\text{INDEX}(ps), n) \ge \text{DEPTH}(reveal}(\gamma, n))$$
 (1.97)

1.1.10 Ordering and sampling

Lemma 20 - Ordering and indexing functions.

Given an arbitrary finite set C, and another set I with a total order <. Any invertible

function total over $C, f: C \to I$ defines a total order $<_f$ over C as follows:

$$<_f \subseteq C \times C \tag{1.98}$$

$$\forall c, c' \in C, c <_f c' \iff f(c) < f(c') \tag{1.99}$$

Proof. f is injective wrt I, so $Image(f) = J \subseteq I$. Since < restricted to a subset $(<_J)$ is also a total order over J. Since f is invertible, C and J are isomorphic and therefore the total order < on J carries over to C.

Corollary 21 – hash orders.

Any hash function defines a total order on a finite set of byte slices.

Proof. The collision free nature of the hash function makes it practically invertible. The actual hashes when read as binary encodings of integers, offer a natural integer ordering over the values.

Example: the prefixed BMT hash transform (see 28) defines a total order over a set of chunks.

Definition 22 – Sampler function.

Using f and its derivative ordering on $C \subseteq Dom(f)$ we represent C as an ordered sequence:

$$\overrightarrow{Seq}$$
: $(T \to T) \times \mathcal{P}(T) \to T*$ (1.100)

$$\overrightarrow{Seq} : (T \to T) \times \mathcal{P}(T) \to T*$$

$$\overrightarrow{Seq}(f,C) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} C'$$
(1.100)

such that
$$f(C'[i]) < f(C'[j])$$
 for every $0 \le i < j < |C|$ (1.102)

Finally, we define a sampler function for any f invertible with an image having a total order and $C \subseteq Dom(f)$ such that it selects a prefix slice of length l from the ordered C:

Sampler:
$$(T \to T) \times \mathcal{P}(T) \times uint64 \to T+$$
 (1.103)

$$Sampler(f, C, l) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \overrightarrow{Seq}(f, C) [:l]$$

$$(1.104)$$

1.2 Redistribution game

Definition 23 – Redistribution game round.

Define γ as a redistribution game round. γ is conceived of as a multidimensional index:

$$\Gamma \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} uint64 \times uint64 \times uint64 \tag{1.105}$$

$$\gamma \in \Gamma = \langle c, \sigma, i \rangle \tag{1.106}$$

$$CHAIN(\gamma)$$
 c ID of the blockchain context (1.107)

SERIES(
$$\gamma$$
) σ index of the parallel series (1.108)

$$ROUND(\gamma)$$
 i sequential index of the round (1.109)

Define BLOCK(γ) as the starting block height of this particular game γ :

$$\operatorname{BLOCK}(\gamma) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \operatorname{ROUND}(\gamma) \cdot \operatorname{ROUND_LENGTH} + \operatorname{START_BLOCK}$$
 (1.110)

Ordering by sequential index defines the chain of games, which lets us define the *Prev* function:

$$Prev : \Gamma \to \Gamma$$
 (1.111)

$$Prev(\langle c, \sigma, i \rangle) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \langle c, \sigma, i - 1 \rangle$$
 (1.112)

1.2.1 Transactions and on-chain registers

The smart contract receives transactions from applicants in phases. The following virtual registers capture the information given in these transactions that are relevant for defining the winner:

- batches (see definition 19)
- stakes (see definition 24)
- commits (see definition 25)
- reveals (see definition 26)

Definition 24 - Stakes.

We define *Stakes* as the registry of stakes resulting from transactions sent to the staking contract. A record is a tuple of a node overlay, the stake balance and the committed stake

and can be updated.

Stakes:
$$\Gamma \to Nodes \times uint64 \times uint64$$
 (1.113)

$$\langle n, s, m \rangle \in Stakes(\gamma) \Leftrightarrow$$
 (1.114)

RIGHT AGE
$$\exists b' < b - \text{MIN_STAKE_AGE}, \tau \in \text{Transactions}(b')$$
 (1.115)

NODE OVERLAY
$$n = H(\operatorname{origin}(\tau) \oplus \operatorname{BZZ_NETWORK_ID} \oplus \operatorname{data}(\tau)[0])$$
 (1.116)

STAKE BALANCE
$$s = \operatorname{amount}(\tau)$$
 (1.117)

COMMITTED STAKE
$$m = \operatorname{data}(\tau)[1]$$
 (1.118)

There is only one stake allowed per node, so we can define the staked amount belonging to a node as the minumum of the stake balance and the committed stake times the unit price of storage:

Stake:
$$\Gamma \times Nodes \rightarrow uint64$$
 (1.119)

$$Stake(\gamma, n) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} min(s, m \cdot Price(\gamma))$$
 (1.120)

Definition 25 - Commits.

We define $Commits(\gamma)$ as the registry of applications for a game γ resulting from a transaction sent to the game contract's commit endpoint. A tuple of the overlay of the committing node, its commitment hash and the number of the block containing the transaction is entered in the register after verifying that (i) the transaction was sent during the commit phase (right time), and (ii) that the node has enough stake and is not frozen (right amount).

Commits:
$$\Gamma \to Nodes \times Segment \times Blocks$$
 (1.121)

$$\langle n, h, b \rangle \in Commits(\gamma) \iff (1.122)$$

RIGHT TIME
$$b < PHASE_LENGTH \mod ROUND_LENGTH$$
 (1.123)

RIGHT AMOUNT
$$stake(\gamma, n) \ge \texttt{MINIMUM_STAKE}$$
 (1.124)

$$(REDUNDANCY) (1.125)$$

Definition 26 – Reveals.

We define *Reveals* as the registry of reveals resulting from a transaction sent to the game contract's reveal endpoint. The reveal record is a tuple of the node overlay, the two commitment hashes, the self-reported storage depth, a serial index used for sorting, the obfuscation key, and the block number. The record is entered in the register after it is validated that (i) it was submitted during the reveal phase (right time), (ii) the commitments when obfuscated match the commit by the same node (right reveal), and (iii) that the neighbourhood selection anchor falls within the node's area of responsibility using the self-reported depth

(right location).

$$RevealEntry : Nodes \times Address^2 \times uint8^2 \times Nonce \times (Blddes)$$

$$Reveals : \Gamma \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(RevealEntry) \qquad (1.127)$$

$$r = \langle n, chc, chs, sd, i, k, b \rangle \in Reveals(\gamma) \iff \langle \qquad \qquad (1.128)$$

$$NODE(r) = n \qquad \qquad (1.129)$$

$$CHC(r) = chc \qquad \qquad (1.130)$$

$$CHS(r) = chs \qquad \qquad (1.131)$$

$$DEPTH(r) = sd \qquad \qquad (1.132)$$

$$INDEX(r) = i \qquad \qquad (1.133)$$

$$NONCE(r) = k \qquad \qquad (1.134)$$

$$BLOCK(r) = b \qquad \qquad (1.135)$$

$$\Rightarrow \qquad \qquad (1.136)$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \qquad \qquad (1.137)$$

$$RIGHT\ TIME \qquad p \leq b < 2p \mod r \qquad \qquad (1.138)$$

$$p = \text{PHASE_LENGTH}, r = \text{ROUND_LENGTH} \qquad (1.139)$$

$$RIGHT\ REVEAL \qquad H(n \oplus sd \oplus chc \oplus chs \oplus k) = h \text{ such that} 1.140)$$

$$\langle n, h, b' \rangle \in Commits(\gamma) \text{ for some } b' \qquad (1.141)$$

$$RIGHT\ LOCATION \qquad PO(addr(n), NSA(Prev(\gamma))) \geq sd \qquad (1.142)$$

$$(RESPONSIBILITY) \qquad (1.143)$$

There is only one reveal allowed per node, so we can define the reveal belonging to a node:

$$Reveal : \Gamma \times Nodes \rightarrow RevealEntry$$
 (1.144)

$$Reveal(\gamma, n) = r \tag{1.145}$$

such that

$$n = Node(r) (1.146)$$

$$r \in Reveals(\gamma)$$
 (1.147)

1.2.2 Random nonces

Definition 27 - Random nonces for the round.

From the round's random seed (see definition 103 appendix??) we can derive all the necessary

random input nonces:

N.HOOD SELECTION ANCHOR
$$NSA(\gamma) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} H(\mathcal{R}(\gamma) \oplus BE^{64}(SK(\gamma)))$$
 (1.148)

Truth Selection Nonces
$$TSN(\gamma) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} H(\mathcal{R}(\gamma) \oplus BE^8(0))$$
 (1.149)

TRUTH SELECTION NONCES
$$TSN(\gamma) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} H(\mathcal{R}(\gamma) \oplus BE^8(0))$$
 (1.149)
WINNER SELECTION NONCES $WSN(\gamma, i) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} H(\mathcal{R}(\gamma) \oplus BE^8(1))$ (1.150)
RESERVE SAMPLING SALT $RSS(\gamma) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} H(\mathcal{R}(\gamma))$ (1.151)

Reserve sampling salt
$$RSS(\gamma) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} H(\mathcal{R}(\gamma))$$
 (1.151)

SEGMENT SELECTION NONCE
$$SSN(\gamma, i) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} H(\mathcal{R}(\gamma) \oplus BE^8(i))$$
 (1.152)

where

$$SK : \Gamma \rightarrow uint64$$
 (1.153)

$$SK(\gamma) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } |Reveals(\gamma)| > 0 \\ SK(Prev(\gamma)) + 1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$
 (1.154)

Let us now define the witness selection function \mathcal{W} that selects two random witness indexes as well as the last index of the reserve sample such that they are all distinct:

$$\mathcal{W} : \Gamma \times uint64 \times \{0, 1, 2\} \to uint8$$

$$\mathcal{W}(\gamma, m, k) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} SSN(\gamma, 0) \mod m - 1 & \text{if } k = 0 \\ m - 1 & \text{if } k = 2 \\ m - 2 & \text{if } k = 1 \land \\ SSN(\gamma, 0) = SSN(\gamma, 1) \mod m - 1 \end{cases}$$

$$(1.155)$$

$$SSN(\gamma, 0) = SSN(\gamma, 1) \mod m - 1$$

Winner selection and claim validation 1.2.3

Definition 28 - Prefixed hash.

Define the hash prefixing function prefix(H, p) as a function which when applied to a hash function H and a constant byte slice p outputs a hash function which for every input returns the hash of the input prefixed by p using H.

$$prefix : (byte* \rightarrow Segment) \times byte* \rightarrow (byte* \rightarrow Segment) \quad (1.157)$$

$$prefix(H, p) : byte* \rightarrow Segment$$

$$refix(H, p)(b) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} H(p \oplus b)$$

$$(1.158)$$

$$prefix(H,p)(b) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} H(p \oplus b)$$
 (1.159)

Exceptionally, we define the prefixed version of BMT hash (denoted as BMT[]) as one that uses the prefixed verson of its base hash:

$$BMT[]$$
: $byte* \rightarrow Chunk \times byte\{8\} \rightarrow Segment$ (1.160)

$$BMT[p] \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} BMT[prefix(H, p)]$$
 (1.161)

Definition 29 - Transformed chunk reserve sample.

Let us now define the chunk transformation function $\Delta^{C}(p)$ for a random nonce prefix p as follows:

$$\Delta^C$$
: Nonce \rightarrow Chunks \rightarrow Segment (1.162)

$$\Delta^{C}(p)$$
 : Chunks \rightarrow Segment (1.163)

$$\Delta^{C}(p)(c) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} BMT[p](\text{DATA}(c), \text{METADATA}(c))$$
 (1.164)

Define the transformed reserve sample $RS^C(\gamma,n)$ for game γ and node n as the first 2^d chunks of the node's reserve at block $\operatorname{BLOCK}(\gamma)$, using the ordering defined (see lemma 20 and definition 22) by the hash (see definition 28) of their data using BMT with 256-bit Keccak prefixed with random nonce p as its base hash.

$$RS^C : \Gamma \times Nodes \rightarrow Chunks*$$
 (1.165)

$$RS^{C}(\gamma, n) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} Sampler(\Delta^{C}(p), Reserve(\gamma, n), 2^{d})$$
 (1.166)

where

$$d = SAMPLE_DEPTH (see ??)$$
 (1.167)

$$p = RSS(\gamma) \text{ (see definition 27)}$$
 (1.168)

Definition 30 - Chunk reserve sample commitment hash.

Define $CH^{C}(\gamma, n, \gamma)$ for game γ and node n as the BMT chunk hash of the packed address chunk (see definition 11) packing the chunks of the transformed reserve sample (see definition 29) for game γ and node n.

$$CH^C$$
: $\Gamma \times Nodes \rightarrow Address$ (1.169)

$$CH^{C}(\gamma, n) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} Address(PAC^{C}(RS^{C}(\gamma, n), p))$$
 (1.170)

where

$$p = RSS(\gamma)$$
 (see definition 27) (1.171)

and where

$$PAC^{C}$$
: $Chunks* \times Nonce \rightarrow Chunks$ (1.172)

$$PAC^{C}(C, p) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} CAC \left(\bigoplus_{i=0}^{len(C)-1} Seg(C[i], p), m \right)$$
 (1.173)

where

$$Seg(C[i], p) = Address(C[i]) \oplus \Delta^{C}(p)(C[i])$$
 (1.174)

$$m = LE^{64}(2 \cdot 32 \cdot len(C))$$
 (1.175)

Definition 31 - Transformed slots reserve sample.

Let us now define the slots transformation function $\Delta^{S}(p)$ for a random nonce p as follows:

$$\Delta^S$$
: Nonce \rightarrow Chunks \rightarrow Segment (1.176)

$$\Delta^{S}(p)$$
 : $Chunks \to Segment$ (1.177)

$$\Delta^{S}(p)(c) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} H[p](Slot(Stamp(c))) \tag{1.178}$$

Define the transformed reserve sample $RS^S(\gamma, n)$ for game γ and node n as the first 2^d chunks of the node's reserve at block $BLOCK(\gamma)$, using the ordering defined by the slot transformation function using prefix p:

$$RS^S$$
: $\Gamma \times Nodes \rightarrow Chunks*$ (1.179)

$$RS^{S}(\gamma, n) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} Sampler(\Delta^{S}(p), Reserve(\gamma, n), 2^{d})$$
 (1.180)

where

$$d = SAMPLE_DEPTH (see ??)$$
 (1.181)

$$p = RSS(\gamma)$$
 (see definition 27) (1.182)

Definition 32 - Transformed slots reserve sample commitment hash.

Define $CH^S(\gamma, n)$ for game γ and node n as the BMT chunk hash of the packed address chunk (see definition 11) the chunks of the transformed reserve sample (see definition 29) for game γ and node n.

$$CH^S$$
: $\Gamma \times Nodes \rightarrow Address$ (1.183)

$$CH^{S}: 1 \times Nodes \rightarrow Address$$
 (1.183)
 $CH^{S}(\gamma, n) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} Address(PAC(RS^{S}(\gamma, n), m))$ (1.184)

where

$$m = LE^{64}(32 \cdot 2^d) (1.185)$$

$$d = SAMPLE_DEPTH (see ??)$$
 (1.186)

Definition 33 – Weighted selection.

We define WeightedSelect(w, k) as a sampler function which selects an index 0 < i < len(w) determined by the input nonce (pseudorandom number) k in such a way that the indexes have a probability of being selected proportional to the weights in w.

$$WeightedSelect : uint256 + \times uint256 \rightarrow uint256 +$$
 (1.187)

$$WeightedSelect(w,k) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} i & \text{if } k < w \text{[i]} \mod W \text{[i]}, \\ WeightedSelect(w \text{[$:$i$]},k) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

such that i = len(w) - 1, and where W (cumulative weights) is defined as

$$W : uint256 + \rightarrow uint256 \tag{1.189}$$

$$W[i] \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} w[0] & \text{if } i = 0\\ W[i-1] + w[i] & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$
 (1.190)

Definition 34 - Truth selection.

We determine the truth from reveals through selection weighted by stake density using the truth selection nonce as random input.

$$Truth : \Gamma \to RevealEntry$$
 (1.191)

$$Truth(\gamma) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} R(\gamma) [WeightedSelect(weights, TSN(\gamma))]$$
 (1.192)

where weights are stake densities such that

$$weights[i] = Stake(\gamma, NODE(R[i])) \cdot 2^{DEPTH(R[i])}$$
 (1.193)

where R is the reveals of the round sorted by index:

$$R = \overrightarrow{Seq}(INDEX, Reveals(\gamma))$$
 (1.194)

Definition 35 – Honest reveals.

We define honest reveals as the subset of reveals for the round agreeing with the truth in reserve commitment hashes and storage depth.

$$HonestReveals : \Gamma \rightarrow RevealEntry*$$
 (1.195)

$$HonestReveals(\gamma) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \overrightarrow{Seq}(INDEX, \{r \in Reveals(\gamma) | Honest(r)\})$$
 (1.196)

where

$$Honest : RevealEntry \rightarrow \{T, F\}$$
 (1.197)

$$Honest(r) \leftrightarrow$$
 (1.198)

$$CHC(r) = CHC(truth(\gamma)) \land \qquad (1.199)$$

$$CHS(r) = CHS(truth(\gamma)) \land \qquad (1.200)$$

$$DEPTH(r) = DEPTH(truth(\gamma))$$
 (1.201)

Definition 36 – Winner selection.

We determine the winner from honest reveals through selection weighted by stake using the winner selection nonce as random input.

Winner:
$$\Gamma \to RevealEntry$$
 (1.202)

$$Winner(\gamma) \ \stackrel{\text{\tiny def}}{=} \ HonestReveals(\gamma) \, [\, WeightedSelect(weights, \, WSN(\gamma)) \,] \ \ (1.203)$$

where weights are stakes such that

$$weights[i] = Stake(\gamma, NODE(HonestReveals[i]))$$
 (1.204)

1.2.4 Proofs of reserve

Definition 37 - Proof of reserve.

Proof of reserve provides evidence that the reserve is replicating relevant content and shows a proof of recency of retaining chunk data in full integrity.

$$POR : SIP^2 \times Stamps$$
 (1.205)

$$\Pi^{\text{R}} : \Gamma \times Chunks \times Chunks + \times \{0, 1, 2\} \rightarrow POR$$
 (1.206)

$$\Pi^{R}(\gamma, c, C, k) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \langle \tag{1.207}$$

WITNESS PROOF
$$\Pi^{\text{SIP}}(c, d \cdot i),$$
 (1.208)

RETENTION PROOF
$$\Pi^{\text{SIP}}(C[i], j),$$
 (1.209)

POSTAGE STAMP
$$Stamp(C[i])$$
 (1.210)

$$\rangle \tag{1.211}$$

where

$$i = \mathcal{W}(\gamma, len(C), k)$$
 (1.212)

$$j = SSN(\gamma, k) \mod 128 \tag{1.213}$$

$$d = \frac{SegCnt(c)}{len(C)} \left(= \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } C = RS^S \\ 2 & \text{if } C = RS^C \end{cases} \right)$$
 (1.214)

Definition 38 - Proof of reserve validation.

$$\mathbb{V}^{\mathbb{R}}$$
 : $\Gamma \times Nodes \times Address \times \{0, 1, 2\} \times POR \rightarrow \{T, F\}$ (1.215)

$$\mathbb{V}^{\mathbb{R}}(\gamma, n, ch, k, \pi) \quad \leftrightarrow \tag{1.216}$$

RELEVANCE
$$\mathbb{V}^{\text{SIP}}(ch, d \cdot i, p_w) \wedge$$
 (1.217)

$$\mathbb{V}^{\text{STAMP}}(ps, \gamma, n) \land \tag{1.218}$$

RETENTION DATA
$$(p_w) = a \land$$
 (1.219)

$$\mathbb{V}^{\text{SIP}}(a,j,p_r) \land \tag{1.220}$$

RECENCY
$$i = \mathcal{W}(\gamma, SeqCnt(p_w), k) \land$$
 (1.221)

$$j = SSN(\gamma, k) \mod 128 \land \tag{1.222}$$

RETRIEVABILITY
$$PO(a, n) \ge sd$$
 (1.223)

where

$$a = \text{Address}(ps)$$
 (1.224)

$$\pi = \langle p_w, p_r, p_s \rangle \tag{1.225}$$

$$sd = \text{DEPTH}(Reveal(\gamma, n))$$
 (1.226)

$$d = \frac{SegCnt(p_w)}{2^D} \left(= \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } C = RS^S \\ 2 & \text{if } C = RS^C \end{cases} \right)$$
 (1.227)

$$D = SAMPLE_DEPTH (see ??)$$
 (1.228)

Definition 39 - Proof of chunk density validation.

Define $\mathbb{V}^{\text{CD}}(\gamma, p_0, p_1, p_2)$ as the validation function for the proof of chunk density for round γ and proof of reserve and segment inclusion proof pairs p_0, p_1, p_2 .

$$PORT : POR \times SIP$$
 (1.229)

$$\mathbb{V}^{\text{CD}} : \Gamma \times PORT^3 \to \{\mathsf{T},\mathsf{F}\}$$
 (1.230)

$$\mathbb{V}^{\text{CD}}(\gamma, \pi_0, \pi_1, \pi_2) \quad \leftrightarrow \tag{1.231}$$

RIGHT DATA SEGMENT DATA
$$(pr_k)$$
 = DATA (pt_k) for $k \in \{0, 1, 2\} \land (1.232)$

RIGHT ADDRESS SISTER
$$(pw_k, 0) = ta_k$$
 for $k \in \{0, 1, 2\} \land$ (1.233)

RIGHT ORDER
$$ta_0 < ta_1 < ta_2 \land$$
 (1.234)

RIGHT SIZE
$$ta_2 \leq \text{MAX_SAMPLE_VALUE}$$
 (1.235)

where for $k \in \{0, 1, 2\}$

$$ta_k = H_{\Pi}(p, j_k, pt_k) \tag{1.236}$$

$$j_k = SSN(\gamma, k) \mod 128 \tag{1.237}$$

$$\pi_k = \langle \langle pw_k, pr_k, \rangle, pt_k \rangle \tag{1.238}$$

and where

$$p = RSS(Prev(\gamma))$$
 (see definition 27) (1.239)

Definition 40 - Proof of stamp density validation.

Define $\mathbb{V}^{\text{SD}}(\gamma, ps_0, ps_1, ps_2)$ as the validation function for the proof of stamp density for round γ and postage stamps ps_0, ps_1, ps_2 .

$$\mathbb{V}^{\text{SD}} : \Gamma \times Stamps^3 \to \{\mathtt{T},\mathtt{F}\}$$
 (1.240)

$$\mathbb{V}^{\text{SD}}(\gamma, ps_0, ps_1, ps_2) \quad \leftrightarrow \tag{1.241}$$

RIGHT ORDER
$$ta_0 < ta_1 < ta_2 \land$$
 (1.242)

RIGHT SIZE
$$ta_2 \leq \text{MAX_SAMPLE_VALUE}$$
 (1.243)

where for $k \in \{0, 1, 2\}$

$$ta_k = H(Slot(ps_k) \oplus p) \tag{1.244}$$

and where

$$p = RSS(Prev(\gamma))$$
 (see definition 27) (1.245)

Definition 41 - Proof of entitlement.

Proof of entitlement captures all the evidence a node needs to submit with their claim transaction to validate.

$$POE : PORT^3 \times POR^3$$
 (1.246)

$$\Pi^{\text{ENT}} : \Gamma \times Nodes \to POE$$
 (1.247)

$$\Pi^{\text{ENT}}(\gamma, n) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \langle \tag{1.248}$$

$$\langle \Pi^{POR}(\gamma, n, PAC^{C}(crs, p), crs, 0), pt_0 \rangle,$$
 (1.249)

$$\langle \Pi^{POR}(\gamma, n, PAC^C(crs, p), crs, 1), pt_1 \rangle,$$
 (1.250)

$$\langle \Pi^{POR}(\gamma, n, PAC^C(crs, p), crs, 2), pt_2 \rangle,$$
 (1.251)

$$\Pi^{POR}(\gamma, n, PAC(srs), srs, 0), \tag{1.252}$$

$$\Pi^{POR}(\gamma, n, PAC(srs), srs, 1), \tag{1.253}$$

$$\Pi^{POR}(\gamma, n, PAC(srs), srs, 2), \tag{1.254}$$

$$\rangle \tag{1.255}$$

where for $k \in \{0, 1, 2\}$

$$pt_k = \Pi_{prefix}^{SIP}(p, r[i_k], j_k)$$
 (1.256)

$$j_k = SSN(\gamma, k) \mod 128 \tag{1.257}$$

$$i_k = \mathcal{W}(\gamma, length(crs), k)$$
 (1.258)

and where

$$crs = RS^{C}(\gamma, n) \tag{1.259}$$

$$srs = RS^{S}(\gamma, n) \tag{1.260}$$

$$p = RSS(Prev(\gamma))$$
 (see definition 27) (1.261)

Definition 42 - Winner's claim validation.

Define $\mathbb{V}^{\text{\tiny POE}}(\gamma,p)$ as the validation function for the proof of entitlement p as part of the

winning claim for game γ :

$$\mathbb{V}^{\text{POE}} : \Gamma \times POE \to \{\text{T,F}\}$$
 (1.262)

$$\mathbb{V}^{\text{POE}}(\gamma, p) \quad \Leftrightarrow \tag{1.263}$$

RESERVE: (1.264)

CHUNKS
$$\forall k \in \{0, 1, 2\}, \mathbb{V}^{\mathbb{R}}(\gamma, n, \text{CHC}(r), k, \pi_k) \land (1.265)$$

STAMPS
$$\forall k \in \{0, 1, 2\}, \mathbb{V}^{\mathbb{R}}(\gamma, n, \text{CHS}(r), k, \phi_k) \land (1.266)$$

RESERVE SIZE: (1.267)

CHUNK DENSITY
$$\mathbb{V}^{\text{CD}}(\gamma, \langle \pi_0, pt_0 \rangle, \langle \pi_1, pt_1 \rangle, \langle \pi_2, pt_2 \rangle) \wedge$$
 (1.268)

STAMP DENSITY
$$\mathbb{V}^{\text{SD}}(\gamma, \text{PS}(\phi_0), \text{PS}(\phi_1), \text{PS}(\phi_2))$$
 (1.269)

where

$$n = NODE(r) \tag{1.270}$$

$$r = Winner(\gamma) \tag{1.271}$$

$$p = \langle \langle \pi_0, pt_0 \rangle, \langle \pi_1, pt_1 \rangle, \langle \pi_2, pt_2 \rangle, \phi_0, \phi_1, \phi_2 \rangle$$
 (1.272)

Corollary 43 - Outpayment scheme is fair.

Rewarding the pot to randomly selected neighbourhood implements a redistribution scheme that is fair across neighbourhoods.

Proof. With the consensus mechanism we can show that the Nash-optimal strategy of nodes is to follow the protocol and consent on the reserve. On the other hand, the optimal strategy for uploaders is to uniformly distribute chunks across the name space. As a consequence, nodes are expected to have identical storage depth and its variance is independent of being chosen. Long term then relative cumulative outpayments by the redistribution game converge to the fair share.

Secondly, we argue that the mode of selecting the winner is fair within neighbourhoods.

Proof.

Chapter 2

Data types and algorithms

2.1 Built-in primitives

2.1.1 Crypto

This section describes the crypto primitives used throughout the specification. They are exposed as buzz built-in functions. The modules are hashing, random number generation, key derivation, symmetric and asymmetric encryption (ECIES), mining (i.e., finding a nonce), elliptic curve key generation, digital signature (ECDSA), Diffie-Hellman shared secret (ECDH) and Reed-Solomon (RS) erasure coding.

Some of the built-in crypto primitives (notably, sha3 hash, and ECDSA ecrecover) are replicating crypto functionality of the Ethereum VM. These are defined here with the help of ethereum api calls to a smart contract. This smart contract just implements the primitives of "buzz" and only has read methods.

Hashing

The base hash function implements Keccak256 hash as used in Ethereum.

Definition 44 - Hashing.

```
Random number generation
Definition 45 – Random number generation.
   // /crypto
                                                                          1
                                                                       2
define function random type
                                                                       3
    return [@type size]byte
Scrypt key derivation
The crypto key derivation function implements scrypt
Definition 46 - Scrypt key derivation.
   // /crypto
                                                                          1
                                                                       2
define type salt as [segment size] byte
                                                                       3
                                                                       4
define type key as [segment size] byte
                                                                       5
                                                                       6
// params for scrypt key derivation function
                                                                       7
// scrypt.key(password, salt, n, r, p, 32) to generate key
                                                                       8
                                                                       9
define type kdf
                                                                       10
    n int // 262144
                                                                       11
    r int // 8
                                                                       12
    p int // 1
                                                                       13
                                                                       14
define function scrypt from @password
                                                                       15
    with salt
                                                                       16
    using kdf
                                                                       17
    return key
                                                                       18
```

ethereum/call "sha3" with @input append= @suff

on context contracts "buzz"

7

Mining helper

This module provides a very simple helper function that finds a nonce that when given as the single argument to a mining function returns true.

Definition 47 – Mining a nonce.

```
// /crypto

define type nonce as [segment size]byte

define function mine @f function of nonce return bool

as
    @nonce = random key
    return @nonce if call @f @nonce
    self @f
```

Symmetric encryption

Symmetric encryption uses a modified blockcipher with 32 byte blocksize in counter mode. The segment keys are generated by hashing the chunk-specific encryption key with the counter and hash that again. This second step is required so that a segment can be selectively disclosed in a 3rd party provable way yet without compromising the security of the rest of the chunk.

The module provides input length preserving blockcipher encryption.

Definition 48 - Blockcipher.

```
// /crypto
                                                                      1
                                                                   2
// two-way (en/de)crypt function for segment
                                                                   3
define function crypt.segment segment
                                                                   4
    with key
                                                                   5
    at @i uint8
                                                                   6
                                                                   7
    hash Okey and Oi
                         // counter mode
                                                                   8
                             // extra hashing
        hash
                                                                   9
        to Osegment length // chop if needed
                                                                   10
        xor @segment
                             // xor key with segment
                                                                   11
                                                                   12
// two-way (en/de)crypt function for arbitrary length
                                                                   13
define function crypt @input [] byte
                                                                   14
```

```
with key
                                                                  15
    return [@input length]byte
                                                                  16
                                                                  17
as
    Osegments = Oinput each segment size // iterate segments 18
        of input
        go crypt.segment at @i++ with @key // concurrent crypt 19
           on segments
    return wait for @segments
                                             // wait for results 20
                                             // join (en/de)
                                                                  21
        join
           crypted segments
```

Elliptic curve keys

Public key cryptography is the same as in Ethereum, it uses the secp256k1 elliptic curve.

Definition 49 – Elliptic curve key generation.

```
// /crypto
                                                                         1
define type pubkey as [64] byte
                                                                      2
define type keypair
                                                                      3
    privkey [32] byte
                                                                      4
    pubkey
                                                                      5
                                                                      6
define type address as [20] byte
                                                                      7
                                                                      8
define function address pubkey
                                                                      9
    return address
                                                                      10
                                                                      11
as
    hash pubkey
                                                                      12
        from 12
                                                                      13
                                                                      14
define function generate
                                                                      15
    ?using entropy
                                                                      16
                                                                      17
as
    @entropy = random segment if no @entropy
                                                                      18
    http/get "signer/generate?entropy=" append @entropy
                                                                      19
        as keypair
                                                                      20
```

Asymmetric encryption

Asymmetric encryption implements ECIES based on the secp256k1 elliptic curve.

Definition 50 - Asymmetric encryption.

```
// /crypto
                                                                        1
                                                                     2
define function encrypt @input []byte
                                                                     3
    for pubkey
                                                                     4
    return [@input length]byte
                                                                     5
                                                                     6
define function decrypt @input []byte
                                                                     7
    with keypair
                                                                     8
    return [@input length]byte
                                                                     9
```

Signature

Crypto's built-in signature module implements secp2156k1 elliptic curve based ECDSA. The actual signing happens in the external signer running as a separate process (possibly within the secure enclave). As customary in Ethereum, the signature is represented and serialised using the r/s/v format,

Definition 51 - Signature.

```
// /crypto
                                                                          1
                                                                       2
define type signature
                                                                       3
    r segment
                                                                       4
    s segment
                                                                       5
    v uint8
                                                                       6
    signer private keypair
                                                                       7
                                                                       8
                                                                       9
define type doc
                                                                       10
    preamble []byte
                                                                       11
    context [] byte
                                                                       12
    asset
              segment
                                                                       13
                                                                       14
define function sign @input []byte
                                                                       15
    by keypair
                                                                       16
    return signature
                                                                       17
                                                                       18
as
```

```
@doc = doc{ "swarm signature", context caller, @input }
                                                                    19
    @sig = http/get "signer/sign?text=" append @doc
                                                                    20
        append "&account=" append @keypair pubkey address
                                                                    21
            as signature
                                                                    22
    Osig signer = Okeypair
                                                                    23
                                                                    24
    @sig
                                                                    25
define function recover signature
                                                                    26
    with @input []byte
                                                                    27
    from @caller []byte
                                                                    28
    return pubkey
                                                                    29
                                                                    30
as
    @doc = doc{ "swarm signature", @caller, @input } as bytes
                                                                    31
    ethereum/call "ecrecover" with
                                                                    32
        on context contracts "buzz"
                                                                    33
                                                                    34
            as pubkey
```

Diffie-Hellmann shared secret

The shared secret module implements elliptic curve based Diffie–Helmann shared secret (ECDH) using the usual secp256k1 elliptic curve. The actual DH comes from the external signer which is then hashed together with a salt.

Definition 52 - Shared secret.

```
// /crypto
                                                                    2
define function shared.secret between keypair
                                                                    3
    and pubkey
                                                                    4
    using salt
                                                                    5
    return [segment size] byte
                                                                    6
                                                                    7
as
    http/get "signer/dh?pubkey=" append @pubkey append "&
                                                                    8
       account=" Okeypair address
        hash with @salt
                                                                    9
```

Erasure coding

Erasure coding interface provides wrappers extend/repair for the encoder/decoder that work directly on a list of chunks.¹

Assuming n out of m coding. extend takes a list of n data chunks and an argument for the number of required parities. It returns the parity chunks only. repair takes a list of m chunks (extended with all parities) and an argument for the number of parities p = m - n, that designate the last p chunks as parity chunks. It returns the list of n repaired data chunks only. The encoder does not know which parts are invalid, so missing or invalid chunks should be set to nil in the argument to repair. If parity chunks are needed to be repaired, you call repair Ochunks with Oparities; extend with Oparities

Definition 53 - CRS erasure code interface definition.

```
// /crypto/crs
                                                                         1
                                                                      2
define function extend @chunks [] chunk
                                                                      3
    with Oparities uint
                                                                      4
    return [@parities]chunk
                                                                      5
                                                                      6
                                                                      7
define function repair @chunks [] chunk
    with Oparities uint
                                                                      8
   return [@chunks length - @parities]chunk
                                                                      9
Definition 54 - CRS erasure coding parameters.
   // /crypto/crs
                                                                         1
define strategy as "race"|"fallback"|"disabled"
                                                                      2
                                                                      3
                                                                      4
define type params
    parities uint
                                                                      5
    strategy
                                                                      6
```

2.1.2 State store

Definition 55 - State store.

```
// /statestore
2
define type key []byte 3
```

¹Cauchy-Reed-Solomon erasure codes based on https://github.com/klauspost/reedsolomon.

```
define type db []byte
                                                                      4
define type value []byte
                                                                      5
                                                                      6
define function create db
                                                                      7
                                                                      8
define function destroy db
                                                                      9
                                                                      10
define function put value
                                                                      11
    to db
                                                                      12
                                                                      13
    on key
                                                                      14
define function get key
                                                                      15
    from db
                                                                      16
    return value
                                                                      17
```

2.1.3 Local context and configuration

```
Definition 56 - Context.
```

```
// /context

define type contract as "buzz"|"chequebook"|"postage"|""

define type context
    contracts [contract]ethereum/address
```

2.2 Bzz address

2.2.1 Overlay address

Swarm's overlay network uses 32-byte addresses. In order to help uniform utilisation of the address space, these addresses must be derived using a hash function. A Swarm node must be associated a Swarm base account or bzz account, which is an Ethereum account that the node (operator) must possess the private key for. The node's overlay address is derived the public key of this account.

Definition 57 - Swarm overlay address of node A.

$$overlayAddress(A) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} Hash(ethAddress|bzzNetworkID)$$
 (2.1)

where

- Hash is the 256-bit Keccak SHA3 hash function
- ethAddress the ethereum address (bytes, not hex) derived from the node's base account public key: $account \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} PubKey(K_A^{bzz})[12:32]$), where
 - *PubKey* is the *uncompressed* form of the public key of a keypair *including* its 04 (uncompressed) prefix.
 - K_A^{bzz} refers to the node's bzz account key pair
- *bzzNetworkID* is the bzz network id of the swarm network serialised as a little-endian binary *uint64*.

In a way, deriving the node address from a public key means the overlay address space is not freely available: to occupy an address you must possess the private key of the address which other nodes need to verify. Such authentication is easy using a digital signature of a shared consensual piece of text, see 2.2.

2.2.2 Underlay address

To enable peers to locate the a node on the network, the overlay address is paired with an underlay address. The underlay address is a string representation of the node's network location on the underlying transport layer. It is used by nodes to dial other nodes to establish keep-alive peer to peer connections.

2.2.3 BZZ address

Bzz address is functionally the pairing of overlay and underlay addresses. In order to ensure that an overlay address is derived from an account the node possesses as well as verifiably attest to an underlay address a node can be called on, bzz addresses are communicated in the following transfer format:

Definition 59 - Swarm bzz address transfer format.

```
// ID: /swarm/handshake/1.0.0/bzzaddress 1

syntax = "proto3"; 3
```

```
message BzzAddress {
   bytes Underlay = 1;
   Signature Sig = 2;
   bytes Overlay = 3;
}
```

Here the signature is attesting to the association of an overlay and an underlay address for a network.

Definition 60 - Signed underlay address of node A.

$$signedUnderlay(A) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} Sign(underlay|overlay|bzzNetworkID)$$
 (2.2)

of the underlay with overlay and bzz network ID appended as plaintext and hashes the resulting public key together with the bzz network ID.

Definition 61 - Node addresses: overlay, underlay, bzz address.

```
// /bzz
                                                                       1
                                                                    2
define type overlay as [segment size] byte
                                                                    3
define type underlay []byte
                                                                    4
                                                                    5
define function overlay.address of pubkey
                                                                    6
    within Onetwork uint64
                                                                    7
                                                                    8
as
    hash Opubkey address and Onetwork
                                                                    9
        as overlay
                                                                    10
                                                                    11
define function valid bzz.address
                                                                    12
    within Onetwork uint64
                                                                    13
                                                                    14
as
    assert @bzz.address overlay == overlay.address of crypto/
                                                                    15
       recover from @bzz.address signature with @bzz.address
       @underlay
        within Onetwork
                                                                    16
                                                                    17
define function bzz.address of overlay
                                                                    18
    from underlay
                                                                    19
```

```
by @account ethereum/address 20
as 21
@sig = crypto/sign @underlay by @account 22
bzz.address{ @overlay, @underlay, @sig } 23
```

In order to get the overlay address from the transfer format peer info, one recovers from signature the peer's base account public key using the plaintext that is constructed as per 60. From the public key, the overlay can be calculated as in 3. The overlay address thus obtained needs to be checked against the one provided in the handshake.

Signing of the underlay enables preflight authentication of the underlay of a trusted but not connected node.

Since underlays are meant to be volatile, we can assume and in fact expect multiple underlays signed by the same node. However, these are meant to be temporally ordered. So one with a newer timestamp invalidates the older one.

In order to make sure that the node connected through that underlay does indeed operate the overlay address, its authentication must be obtained through the peer connection that was initiated by dialing the underlay. The This protects against malicious impersonation of a trusted overlay potentially.

2.3 Chunks, encryption and addressing

2.3.1 Content addressed chunks

First let us define some basic types, such as *payload*, *span*, *segment*. These fixed length byte slices enables verbose expression of fundamental units like segment size or payload size. Definition 62 – segment, payload, span, branches.

```
// /chunk

define type segment as [32]byte // unit for type definitions 3
define type payload as [:4096]byte // variable length max 4 4
   Kilobyte

define type span as uint64 // little endian binary 5
   marshalled

define function branches
```

```
as payload size / segment size
```

8

Now let's turn to the definition of address, key and reference:

Definition 63 - Chunk reference.

Now, define chunk as a object with span and payload.

Definition 64 - Content addressed chunk.

```
// /chunk
                                                                      1
                                                                    2
define type chunk
                                                                    3
              // length of data span subsumed under node
                                                                    4
    payload // max 4096 bytes
                                                                    5
                                                                    6
define function address of chunk
                                                                    7
                                                                    8
as
    Ochunk payload bmt/hash with Ochunk span
                                                                    9
                                                                    10
define function create from payload
                                                                    11
    ?over span
                                                                    12
                                                                    13
as
    Ospan = Opayload length if no Ospan
                                                                    14
    @chunk = chunk{ @span, @payload }
                                                                    15
    return Ochunk if no context encryption
                                                                    16
    @key = encryption.key for @chunk
                                                                    17
    @chunk encrypt with @key
                                                                    18
```

Where length is the content of the length field and reference size is the sum of size of the referencing hash value and that of the decryption key, which is currently 64, as we use 256-bit hashes and 256-bit keys.

In order to remove the padding after decryption before returning the plaintext chunk. **Definition 65** – **Span to payload length.**

```
// /chunk
                                                                           1
                                                                        2
define function payload.length of span
                                                                        3
                                                                        4
    while @span >= 4096
                                                                        5
         @span = @span + 4095
                                                                        6
            / 4096
                                                                        7
            * reference size
                                                                        8
    return @span
Finally, we can define the public API of chunks for retrieval and storage.
Definition 66 - Chunk API retrieval.
   // /chunk
                                                                           1
                                                                        2
define function retrieve reference
                                                                        3
has api GET on "chunk/<reference>"
                                                                        4
                                                                        5
    retrieve Oreference address as chunk
                                                                        6
         (decrypt with Oreference key if Oreference key)
                                                                        7
Definition 67 – Chunk API: storage.
   // /chunk
                                                                           1
                                                                        2
                                                                        3
define function store payload
                                                                        4
    ?over span
                                                                        5
has api POST on "chunk/(?span=<span>)"
                                                                        6
    from payload as body
                                                                        7
                                                                        8
as
    @chunk = create from @payload over @span
                                                                        9
```

10

reference{ @chunk address, @chunk key }

2.3.2 Single owner chunk

Single owner chunks are the second type of chunk in swarm. They constitute the basis of swarm feeds.

```
Definition 68 - Single owner chunks.
```

```
// /soc
                                                                       1
                                                                    2
// data structure for single owner chunk
                                                                    3
define type soc
                                                                    4
                [segment size] byte // id 'within' owner
    id
                                                                    5
       namespace
    signature crypto/signature // owner attests to <content, 6
        id >
                                    // content: embeds a content
    chunk
                                                                    7
       chunk
                                                                    8
// constructor for single owner chunks
                                                                    9
define function create from chunk
                                                                    10
    by @owner crypto/keypair
                                                                    11
    on @id [segment size]byte
                                                                    12
                                                                    13
 as
    Osig = crypto/sign Oid and Ochunk address by Oowner
                                                                    14
    soc{ @id, @sig, @chunk }
                                                                    15
                                                                    16
define function address soc
                                                                    17
as
                                                                    18
    hash Osoc id and Osoc signature signer address
                                                                    19
Definition 69 - Single owner chunk API: retrieval.
   // /soc
                                                                       1
                                                                    2
define function retrieve @id [segment size]byte
                                                                    3
    by Cowner ethereum/address
                                                                    4
    ?with key
                                                                    5
has api GET on "soc/<owner>/<id>(?key=<key>)"
                                                                    6
                                                                    7
as
    retrieve hash @id and @owner
                                                                    8
        as soc
                                                                    9
             chunk (decrypt with Okey if Okey)
                                                                    10
```

Definition 70 - Single owner chunk API: storage.

```
// /soc
                                                                       1
                                                                    2
define function store payload
                                                                    3
    on @id [segment size]byte
                                                                    4
    by Cowner ethereum/address
                                                                    5
    ?over span
                                                                    6
has api POST on "soc/<owner>/<id>?span=<span>&encrypt=<encrypt>
                                                                    8
    from <payload> as body
                                                                    9
as
    Ospan = Opayload length if no Ospan
                                                                    10
    @chunk = chunk{ @span, @payload }
                                                                    11
    if context encryption then
                                                                    12
        @key = encryption.key for @chunk
                                                                    13
        @chunk encrypt= with @key
                                                                    14
    Osoc = create from Ochunk on Oid by private key of Oowner
                                                                    15
    reference{ @soc store address, @key }
                                                                    16
```

2.3.3 Binary Merkle Tree Hash

The hashing method used to obtain the address of the default content addressed chunk is called the binary Merkle tree hash, or BMT hash for short.

Calculating the BMT hash

The base segments of the binary tree are subsequences of the chunk content data. The size of segments is 32 bytes, which is the digest size of the *base hash* used to construct the tree. Given the Swarm hash tree used to represent files (see 2.5.1) assumes that intermediate chunks package references to other chunks.

Obtaining the BMT hash of a sequence involves the following steps:

- 1. padding If the content is shorter than the maximum chunk Size (4096 bytes), it is padded with zeros up to chunk size. Note that this zero padding is only for hashing and does not impact chunk data sizes.
- 2. $chunk\ data\ layer$ Calculate the base hash of $pairs\ of\ segments$ in the padded chunk, i.e., segment size (2*32) units of data and concatenate the results.

- 3. building the tree Repeat previous step on the result until the result is just one section.
- 4. calculate span Calculate the span of the data, i.e., the size of the data that is subsumed under the chunk represented by the unpadded data as a 64-bit little-endian integer value (see 2.5.1).
- 5. *integrity protection* Prepend the span to the root hash of the binary tree and calculate the base hash of the data.

Definition 71 - BMT hash.

```
// /bmt
                                                                        1
                                                                     2
define function hash payload
                                                                     3
    with span
                                                                     4
                                                                     5
as
    @padded = @payload as [:chunk size]byte // use zero
                                                                     6
       padding
    // for BMT hashing only
                                                                     7
    hash Ospan and root of Opadded over chunk size
                                                                     8
                                                                     9
define function root of @section []byte
                                                                     10
    over @len uint
                                                                     11
as
                                                                     12
    return hash @section
                                  // data level
                                                                     13
        if @len == 2 * segment size
                                                                     14
    @len /= 2
                                 // recursive call
                                                                     15
    Ochildren = Osection each Olen go self over Olen
                                                                     16
    wait for @children
                                                                     17
        join hash
                                                                     18
```

Inclusion proofs

Having the segments align with the hashes packaged in these chunks one can extend the notion of inclusion proofs to files. The BMT hash enables compact 3rd party verifiable segment inclusion proofs.

2.3.4 Encryption

Symmetric encryption in Swarm is using a slightly modified version blockcipher in counter mode.

The encryption seed for the chunk is derived from the master seed if given, otherwise just

generated randomly.

The reference to a single chunk (and the whole content) is the concatenation of the hash of encrypted data and the decryption key (see 63). This means the encrypted Swarm reference (64 bytes) will be longer than the unencrypted one (32 bytes). When a node syncs encrypted chunks, it does not share the full references (or the decryption keys) with the other nodes in any way. Therefore, other nodes will be unable to access the original data, or in fact, even to detect whether a chunk is encrypted.

Definition 72 - Chunk encryption/decryption API.

```
1
// generate key for a chunk
                                                                     2
define encryption.key for chunk
                                                                     3
    ?with @seed [segment.size]byte
                                                                     4
                                                                     5
as
    return crypto/random key if no @seed // generate new
                                                                     6
    hash Oseed and Ochunk address
                                                                     7
                                                                     8
define function encrypt chunk
                                                                     9
    with key
                                                                     10
                                                                     11
as
    Osegments = Ochunk data pad to chunk size
                                                                     12
        each segment size
                                                                     13
            go crypt at @i++ with @key
                                                                     14
    Ospan = chunk span crypt at branches with Oseed
                                                                     15
    @payload = wait for @segments
                                                                     16
                                                                     17
        join
    chunk{ @span, @payload }
                                                                     18
                                                                     19
                                                                     20
                                                                     21
define function decrypt chunk
    with key
                                                                     22
as
                                                                     23
    @span = @chunk span
                                                                     24
        crypt at branches with Okey
                                                                     25
    Osegments = chunk data to Ospan payload.length
                                                                     26
        each segment size
                                                                     27
            go crypt at @i++ with @key
                                                                     28
    @payload = wait for @segments
                                                                     29
        join
                                                                     30
    chunk{ @span, @payload }
                                                                     31
```

Encrypted Swarm chunks are not different from plaintext chunks and therefore no change is needed on the P2P protocol level to accommodate them. The proposed encryption scheme is end-to-end, meaning that encryption and decryption is done on endpoints, i.e., where the http proxy layer runs. This has an important consequence that public gateways cannot be used for encrypted content. On the other hand, the apiary modular design allows for client side encryption on top of external APIs while proxying all other calls via the gateway.

2.4 Postage stamps

2.4.1 Witness type

There can be different implementations of postage stamps that differ in the structure and semantics of the *proof of payment*. To allow for new cryptographic mechanisms to be used as they are developed, the witnessType argument indicates the type of the witness used.

Witness type 0 stands for ECDSA witness, which is an ECDSA signature on the byte slice resulting from the concatenation of 1) preamble constant 2) chunk hash 3) batch reference 4) valid until date.² This is the bare minimum that postage stamp contracts and clients must implement.³

Witness type 1 refers to the RSA witness, which is an RSA signature on the same 128 bytes as above. The binary encoding of the RSA signature is of variable length, and is an Solidity ABI encoded array of the RSA signature s.⁴

The RSA witness is specified so that blind stamping services can be implemented in a simple fashion, in order to mitigate the privacy issues arising from the ability to link chunks signed with the same private key. Even though blind ECDSA signatures also exist, their protocol requires more rounds of communication, making the implementation of such a service more complex, more error-prone and less performant.

The inclusion of the entire public key in each RSA witness rather than storing the public key in contract state and just referencing it from the witness is justified by reducing the gas costs

²The binary encoding of the ECDSA signature is 65 bytes resulting from the concatenation of the r (32 bytes), s (32 bytes) and v (1 byte) parameters of the signature, in this order. The signature is calculated on the secp256k1 elliptic curve, just like the signatures of Ethereum transactions.

³The ECDSA witness is the simplest and cheapest solution both in terms of gas consumed by the stamp verification contract and in terms of computational resources used off chain. Also, it does not rely on cryptographic assumptions in addition to those on which Ethereum critically relies, therefore as long as Ethereum is considered cryptographically secure, no advance in cryptography can render this witness type insecure. This is the justification for this witness type to be the only mandatory witness type to be implemented.

⁴as defined in PKCS #1, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8017 and the RSA public key parameters n (RSA modulus) and e (public exponent).

of interactions with the contract as well as future-proofing the design in case contract state rent is introduced in Ethereum. These considerations are more important than the brevity of postage stamps, marginally reducing the bandwith costs of uploading and forwarding stamped content.

Note that cryptographic advances can render RSA witnesses insecure without rendering Ethereum insecure, therefore RSA witnesses can be phased out in future versions of the protocol, if the security of RSA signatures gets compromised. Note, furthermore, that such blind signing services are not entirely trustless, through the damage they can incur is bounded. Trustless blind stamping services based on ZK proofs are not feasible at this stage, as the current algorithms are not sufficiently performant for the purpose, but given the rapid advances in the field, the development of suitable algorithms can be expected in the future, in which case a corresponding witness type will have to be specified in a separate SWIP.

2.4.2 Contract Upgrades

In order to facilitate the upgrade of the contract either in case of a discovered vulnerability or some feature extension (such as adding new witness types), it is recommended that the part holding the funds with the database of payments and the part that verifies witnesses are in separate contracts so that a backwards-compatible upgrade can be performed with minimal disruption.

In order to avoid centralized control, it is also recommended that it is the witness-verifying contract that is referenced in client configuration so that client operators can independently decide for themselves when and whether to switch to a new contract, as they become available.

Nodes participating in the same postage system are configured to reference the same contract on the same blockchain. This contract must conform to the following interface:

Definition 73 - Postage contract.

This accessor method returns true if the proof embodied by witness checks out for all other arguments within the claimed validity period, i.e. when block.timestamp (the output of TIMESTAMP EVM opcode) is between beginValidity (inclusive) and endValidity (exclusive). Outside of the validity period, the return value is undefined.

Definition 74 – Postage stamp basic types: batchID, address, witness, stamp, validity.

define type batchid as [segment size]byte

2

```
define type address as bzz/address
                                                                     4
define type witness as crypo/signature
                                                                     5
                                                                     6
// postage stamp
                                                                     7
define type stamp
                                                                     8
    batchid
                                                                     9
    address
                                                                     10
    witness
                                                                     11
                                                                     12
define function valid stamp
                                                                     13
as
                                                                     14
    // check validity on blockchain
                                                                     15
    ethereum call "valid" using context contracts "postage"
                                                                     16
        with @stamp
                                                                     17
```

2.5 Files, manifests and data structures

2.5.1 Files and the Swarm hash

This table gives an overview of data sizes a chunk span represents, depending on the level of recursion.

	span					
	unencrypted			encrypted		
level	chunks	log_2 of bytes	standard	chunks	log_2 of bytes	standard
0	1	12	4KB	1	12	4KB
1	128	19	512KB	64	18	256KB
2	16,384	26	67MB	4,096	24	16MB
3	2,097,152	33	8.5GB	262,144	30	1.07GB
4	268.44M	40	1.1TB	16.78M	36	68.7GB
5	34,359.74M	47	140TB	1,073.74M	42	4.4TB

Table 2.1: Size of chunk spans

Calculating the Swarm Hash

Client-side custom redundancy is achieved by RS erasure coding; using it neccessitates some RS parameters.

Definition 75 – File API: upload/storage; swarm hash. // /file 2 define function encode @levels [] chunk stream 3 for Olevel uint 4 as @chunks = @levels at @level // read chunk stream 6 @crs = context crs 7 @m = branches (- @crs parities if @crs) 8 9 @parent = read @m from @chunks // read up to m chunks from 10 stream blocking (append crs/extend with Ocrs parities if Ocrs) 11 each chunk/store // package children 12 reference join as chunk 13 14 if @levels length == @level+1 then 15 @levels append= stream{} 16 go self @levels for @level+1 17 18 write Oparent to Olevels at Olevel+1 19 if no Ochunks then 20 close @levels at @level + 1 21 22 else self @chunks for @level 23 24 define function split @data byte stream 25 26 @level = chunk stream{} 27 go @data each chunk size as chunk 28 write to @chunks 29 @level 30 31 32 define function upload byte stream as @data has api POST on "file/" from @data as body 33 34 as @levels append= @data split 35 go encode @levels for 0 36 @top = @levels each wait for // wait for all levels to 37 close

1

38

return @top at 0

// return root hash as

address

Definition 76 – File API: download/retrieval. // /file 1 2 define function copy to @reader stream of byte{} 3 from Ochunks stream of [] chunk using Obuffers stream of [Obuffer.size]stream of [branches] 5 chunk 6 as 7 @chunks = read @buffers if no @chunks @chunk = read @chunks 8 if no @chunk 9 write @chunks to @buffer 10 self Oreader using Obuffers 11 write @chunk data to @reader 12 13 define function download reference 14 ?using @buffer.size uint64 15 has api GET on "file/<reference>" 16 17 as @reader = stream of byte{} 18 @buffers = stream of [@buffer.size]stream of [branches] 19 chunk/retrieve @reference // root chunk 20 retrieval go decode into Obuffer down to 1 // traverse 21 copy into Oreader from Obuffers 22 23 define function decode chunk 24 into Oresponse chunk stream 25 ?down to @limit uint8 26 27 as 28 @crs = context crs 29 @all = @m = branches 30 if @crs then 31 0m -= 0crs parities 32 if @crs strategy is not "race" then 33 @all = @m34

```
@chunks = @chunk segments up to @all
                                                                      36
        each go as reference retrieve
                                                                      37
    wait for 0m in 0chunks
                                                                      38
                                                                      39
    if @crs then
                                                                      40
        cancel @chunks
                                                                      41
        @chunks = @chunks crs/repair with @crs parities
                                                                      42
                                                                      43
    if Ochunk span < chunk size exp Olimit + 1 then
                                                                      44
        Ochunks each into Oreader
                                                                      45
                                                                      46
                                                                      47
    Ochunks each go self down to Olimit
                                                                      48
Definition 77 - File info.
   // /file
                                                                         1
                                                                      2
define type info
                                                                      3
    mode
                 int64
                                                                      4
    size
                 int64
                                                                      5
```

6

1

2.5.2 Manifests

modified

time

Manifests represent a mapping of strings to references. The primary purpose is to implement document collections (websites) on swarm and enable URL-based addressing of content. This section defines the data structures relevant for manifests as well as the algorithms for lookup and update which implement the manifest API (see ??).

A manifest entry can be conceived of as metadata about a file pointed to and retrievable by its reference (see 2.5.1). The metadata is quite diverse, ranging from information needed for access control, file information similar to one given on file systems, information needed for erasure coding (see ?? and 2.1.1), information for browser, i.e., response headers such as content type (MIME info) and most importantly the reference to the file. Using manifests as simple key-value store is exemplified by access control (see 2.6 and ?? for the specification). **Definition 78** — **Manifest entry.**

```
^{\prime \prime} /manifest
```

```
// manifest entry encodes attributes
                                                                  3
define type entry
                                                                  4
    file/info
                          // FS file/dir info
                                                                  5
    access/params
                          // access control params
                                                                  6
    crs/params
                          // erasure coding - CRS params
                                                                 7
    reference
                          // reference
                                                                  8
    headers
                           // http response headers
                                                                  9
                                                                 10
define type headers
                                                                  11
    content.type [segment size]byte
                                                                  12
Definition 79 - Manifest data structure.
  // /manifest
                                                                    1
                                                                  2
define type node
                                                                  3
                    // reference to chunk serialised as
    entry *entry
       entry
    forks [<<256] fork // sparse array of max 256 fork
                                                                  5
                                                                  6
// fork encodes a branch
                                                                  7
define type fork
                                                                  8
    prefix segment // compaction
                                                                  9
    node *node
                    // reference to chunk serialised as node
                                                                  10
Definition 80 – Manifest API: path lookup.
  // /manifest
                                                                    1
                                                                  2
define function lookup @path []byte
                                                                  3
    in *node
                                                                  4
has api GET on "/manifest/<@node:reference>/<@path>"
                                                                  5
                                                                  6
    context access = @node entry access/params
                                                                  7
    // manifest is a compacted trie
                                                                  8
    @fork = @node forks at head @path
                                                                  9
    // if @path empty, the paths matched return the entry
                                                                  10
    if no Opath then
                                                                  11
                                                                  12
        return Onode entry
                                                                  13
    if Ofork prefix is prefix of Opath then // including ==
                                                                  14
      return self @path from @fork prefix length
                                                                  15
```

```
fail with "not found"
                                                                    17
Definition 81 - Manifest API: update.
  // /manifest
                                                                       1
                                                                    2
define function add *entry
                                                                    3
    to *node
                                                                    4
    on Opath [] byte
                                                                    5
has api PUT on "/manifest/<@node>"
                                                                    6
                                                                    7
                                                                    8
as
    // if called on nil call on zero value
                                                                    9
    @node = node{} if no @node
                                                                    10
                                                                    11
    // if empty path then change entry field of node
                                                                    12
    if no Opath then
                                                                    13
        @node entry = @entry
                                                                    14
        return store @node
                                                                    15
                                                                    16
    // lookup the fork based on the first byte of path
                                                                    17
    @fork = @node forks at head @path
                                                                    18
    // if no fork yet, add the singleton node
                                                                    19
    if no Ofork then
                                                                    20
        Onode forks at head Opath =
                                                                    21
             fork{@path, store node{@entry}}
                                                                    22
        return store @node
                                                                    23
                                                                    24
    @common = prefix of @path and @fork prefix // common cannot 25
        be empty
    @rest = @fork prefix from @common length
                                                                    26
    @newnode = node{}
                                                                    27
    @newnode forks at head @rest = fork{@rest, @fork node}
                                                                    28
    @midnode = self @entry to @newnode on @path from @common
                                                                    29
       length
    @node forks at head @path = fork{ @common, @midnode }
                                                                    30
    @node store
                                                                    31
```

16

Definition 82 - Manifest API: remove.

in Ofork node

 $^{\prime \prime}$ /manifest

```
2
                                                                   3
define function remove Opath [] byte
    from *node
                                                                   4
has api DELETE on "/manifest/<@node>/<@path>"
                                                                   5
                                                                   6
as
    // if called on nil call on zero value
                                                                   7
    return node{} if no @node
                                                                   8
                                                                   9
    // if empty path then change entry field of node
                                                                   10
    if no Opath then
                                                                   11
        return nil if @node forks length == 0
                                                                   12
        Onode entry = nil //entry exists
                                                                   13
        return store @node
                                                                   14
                                                                   15
    // lookup the fork based on the first byte of path
                                                                   16
    @fork = @node forks at head @path
                                                                   17
    // if no fork yet, add the singleton node
                                                                   18
    return Onode if no Ofork
                                                                   19
                                                                   20
    @common = prefix of @path and @fork prefix // common cannot 21
        be empty
    return @node if @common and @fork prefix have different
                                                                   22
                       // path not found
       length
                                                                   23
    Orest = Ofork prefix from Ocommon length
                                                                   24
    Onewnode = self Orest from Ofork node
                                                                   25
                                    // deleted item was terminal
    if no Onewnode then
                                                                   26
       node, delete fork
        Onode forks at head Ores = nil
                                                                   27
    else if @newnode forks length == 1 then // compact non-
                                                                   28
       forking nodes
        @singleton = @newnode forks first
                                                                   29
        Onewprefix = Ocommon append Osingleton prefix
                                                                   30
        Onode forks at head Opath =
                                                                   31
            fork{ @newprefix, @singleton node }
                                                                   32
                                                                   33
        Onode fork at head Opath node = Onewnode
                                                                   34
                                                                   35
    @node store
                                                                   36
```

Definition 83 – Manifest API: merge.

```
// /manifest
                                                                      1
                                                                    2
define function merge @new *node
                                                                   3
    to @old *node
                                                                   4
has api POST on "/manifest/<@old:reference>/<@new:reference>"
                                                                   5
                                                                   6
    // if called on nil call on zero value
                                                                   7
                                                                   8
    return Onew if no Oold
    return Cold if no Cnew
                                                                   9
    @node = node{ @new or @old }
                                                                   10
    Onew forks pos or Cold forks pos
                                                                   11
        each bit @pos go
                                                                   12
            @fork = merge.fork @new forks at @pos
                                                                   13
                 to @old forks at @pos
                                                                   14
            @node forks at @fork prefix head = @fork
                                                                   15
                                                                   16
    @node store
                                                                   17
define function merge.fork @new fork
                                                                   18
    to @old fork
                                                                   19
                                                                   20
as
    @common = prefix of @new prefix and @old prefix
                                                                   21
    Orestnew = Onew prefix from Ocommon length
                                                                   22
    @restold = @old prefix from @common length
                                                                   23
    if no @restnew and no @restold then
                                                                    24
        return fork{@common, merge.node @new reference to @old
                                                                   25
           reference}
    Onode = add Onew reference to nil on Orestnew
                                                                   26
        add to @old reference @restold
                                                                    27
    fork{ @common, @node }
                                                                    28
```

2.5.3 Resolver

Definition 84 - Resolver.

```
define type resolver

api url
address ethereum/address
tlds [] string
```

```
define function resolve @host []byte through @resolver 8
as

@tld = @host split on '.'' last @resolver = @resolvers 10
any tlds any == @tld

ethereum/call "getContentHash" of @host using @resolver api 12
at @resolver address
as address
13
```

2.5.4 Pinning

```
Definition 85 - Pinning.
```

```
// /pin
                                                                        1
                                                                     2
define type pin
                                                                     3
    reference
                                                                     4
    chunks uint64
                                                                     5
                                                                     6
define function list
                                                                     7
    return []pin
                                                                     8
has api GET "/pin/"
                                                                     9
                                                                     10
define function view reference
                                                                     11
    return uint64
                                                                     12
has api GET "/pin/<reference>"
                                                                     13
                                                                     14
define function pin reference
                                                                     15
    return uint64
                                                                     16
has api PUT "/pin/<reference>"
                                                                     17
                                                                     18
define function pin reference
                                                                     19
    return uint64
                                                                     20
has api DELETE "/pin/<reference>"
                                                                     21
```

2.5.5 Tags

```
Definition 86 - Tags.
  // /tag
                                                                      1
                                                                    2
define type tag
                                                                    3
           [segment size]byte
                                                                    4
    reference // the current root
                                                                    5
    complete bool // if local upload finished
                                                                    6
    total uint64 // number of chunks expected
                                                                    7
    split uint64 // number of chunks split
                                                                    8
    stored uint64 // number of chunks stored locally
                                                                    9
          uint64 // number of chunks already in db
                                                                    10
    sent uint64 // number of chunks sent with push-sync
                                                                    11
    synced uint64 // number of chunks synced
                                                                    12
                                                                    13
                                                                    14
define function list
                                                                    15
    return [] tag
                                                                    16
has api GET "/tag/"
                                                                    17
                                                                    18
define function view reference
                                                                    19
    return uint64
                                                                    20
has api GET "/tag/<reference>"
                                                                    21
                                                                    22
define function add reference
                                                                    23
    return uint64
                                                                    24
has api POST "/tag/"
                                                                    25
                                                                    26
define function remove reference
                                                                    27
    return uint64
                                                                    28
has api DELETE "/tag/<reference>"
                                                                    29
2.5.6
       Storage
Definition 87 – Public storage API.
   // /bzz
                                                                      1
define function upload @data stream of byte
                                                                    3
has api POST on "bzz:/<host>/<path>" from @data as body
                                                                    4
as
                                                                    5
```

@root = resolver/resolve @host

```
@manifest = access/unlock @root
                                                                  7
    @entry = file/upload @data
                                                                  8
    Oreference = chunk/store Oentry as [] byte
                                                                  9
    manifest/add @reference to @manifest on @path
                                                                  10
                                                                  11
                                                                  12
define function download @path []byte from @host []byte
                                                                  13
has api POST on "bzz:/<host>/<path>" from @data as body
                                                                  14
                                                                  15
as
    @root = resolver/resolve @host
                                                                  16
    @manifest = access/unlock @root
                                                                  17
    @entry = manifest/lookup @path in @manifest
                                                                  18
    file/download @entry reference
                                                                  19
```

2.6 Access Control

Definition 88 - Access control: auth, hint, parameters, root access manifest.

```
// /access
                                                                        1
                                                                     2
define type auth as "pass" | "pk"
                                                                     3
define type hint as [segment size] byte
                                                                     4
                                                                     5
// access control parameters
                                                                     6
                                                                     7
define type params
                                  // serialises uint8
                                                                     8
  publisher crypto/pubkey
                                  // 65 byte
                                                                     9
  salt
                                  // salt for scrypt/dh
                                                                     10
  hint
                                  // hint to link identity
                                                                     11
                                  // reference to act manifest
                                                                     12
  act
           *node
    root
  kdf
                                  // params for scrypt
                                                                     13
}
                                                                     14
                                                                     15
// root access manifest
                                                                     16
                                                                     17
define type root
                                                                     18
    params
    reference
                                                                     19
```

```
Definition 89 – Session key and auth with credentials.
   // /access
                                                                        1
                                                                     2
define function session.key.pass from hint
                                                                     3
    with
         salt
                                                                     4
    using kdf
                                                                     5
                                                                     6
as
                                                                     7
    crypto/scrypt from input/password using @hint
        with @salt using @kdf
                                                                     8
                                                                     9
define function session.key.pk from hint
                                                                     10
    with crypto/pubkey
                                                                     11
                                                                     12
    using salt
                                                                     13
as
    crypto/shared.secret between
                                                                     14
        input/select key by @hint
                                                                     15
             and Opubkey
                                                                      16
        hash with @salt
                                                                     17
                                                                     18
define function session.key
                                                                     19
                                                                     20
    using params
as
                                                                     21
    if @params auth == "pass" then
                                                                     22
        return session.key.pass from @params hint
                                                                     23
             with Oparams salt using Oparams kdf
                                                                     24
                                                                     25
    session.key.pk from @params hint
                                                                     26
        with Oparams publisher using Oparams salt
                                                                     27
Definition 90 - Access key.
  // /access
                                                                        1
define function access.key
                                                                     2
    using params
                                                                     3
                                                                     4
    @key = session.key using @params
                                                                     5
    return Okey if no Oparams act
                                                                     6
    act.lookup @key in @params act
                                                                     7
                                                                     8
                                                                     9
define function act.lookup key
    in @act *node
                                                                     10
as
                                                                      11
```

```
manifest/lookup hash @key and 0
                                                                     12
             in @act
                                                                     13
                 xor hash 0key and 1
                                                                     14
Definition 91 - Access control API: lock/unlock.
   // /access
                                                                        1
                                                                     2
// control
                                                                     3
define function lock reference
                                                                     4
    using params
                                                                     5
has api POST on "/access/<address>"
                                                                     6
    with Oparams as body
                                                                     7
                                                                     8
as
    @key = hash @reference address and @key
                                                                     9
    @encrypted = @reference as bytes
                                                                     10
        crypto/crypt with Okey
                                                                     11
    root{ @params, @encrypted }
                                                                     12
        store
                                                                     13
                                                                     14
                                                                     15
define function unlock address
                                                                     16
has api GET on "access/<address>"
                                                                     17
                                                                     18
as
    @root = retrieve @address
                                                                     19
        try as root otherwise return @address
                                                                     20
    @key = access.key using @root params
                                                                     21
    Oroot encrypted crypto/crypt with Okey
                                                                     22
        as *node
                                                                     23
Definition 92 - ACT manipulation API: add/remove.
  // /access
                                                                        1
                                                                     2
define type act as manifest/node
                                                                     3
                                                                     4
define function add @keys []crypto/pubkey
                                                                     5
    to *root
                                                                     6
has api PUT on "/access/<root>/"
                                                                     7
    with Okeys as body
                                                                     8
                                                                     9
as
    // get params from the root access structure
                                                                     10
```

```
@params = retrieve @root as root params
                                                                    11
    @access.key = access.key using @params
                                                                    12
    Okeys each Okey
                                                                    13
        Osession.key = session.key using Oparams
                                                                    14
        manifest/add @access.key xor hash @session.key with 1
                                                                    15
            to @act on hash @session.key with 0
                                                                    16
                                                                    17
                                                                    18
define function remove @keys []crypto/pubkey
                                                                    19
    from *root
                                                                    20
has api DELETE on "/access/<root>"
                                                                    21
    with Okeys as body
                                                                    22
                                                                    23
as
    // get params from the root access structure
                                                                    24
    @params = retrieve @root as root params
                                                                    25
    Okeys each Okey
                                                                    26
        Osession.key = session.key using Oparams
                                                                    27
        manifest/remove hash @session.key with 0
                                                                    28
            from Oparams act
                                                                    29
```

2.7 PSS

2.7.1 PSS message

2.7.2 Direct pss message with trojan chunk

Pss has two fundamental types, a message and a trojan chunk structure which wraps the encrypted serialised message and contains a nonce that is mined to make the resulting chunk's content address (BMT hash) to match the targets.

Definition 93 – Basic types: topic, targets, recipient, message and trojan.

```
// /pss

define type topic as [segment size]byte // 4
  obfuscated topic matcher

define type targets as [][]byte // overlay prefixes 5
define type recipient as crypto/pubkey 6
```

```
// pss message
                                                                8
                                                                9
define type message
           segment
                                                                10
   seal
   payload [!:4030] byte // varlength padded to 4030B
                                                                11
                                                                12
// trojan chunk
                                                                13
// the nonce
                                                                14
define type trojan
                                                                15
                         // the nonce to mine
   nonce segment
                                                                16
                             // compressed format
                                                                17
   key pubkey
   message [4064] byte // encrypted msg
                                                                18
```

The message is encoded in a way that allows integrity checking and at the same time obfuscates the topic. The operation to package the payload with a topic is called *sealing*Definition 94 — Sealing/unsealing the message.

```
// /pss
                                                                        1
                                                                     2
define function seal @payload []byte
                                                                     3
    with topic
                                                                     4
                                                                     5
as
    Oseal = hash Opayload and Otopic // obfuscate topic
                                                                     6
        xor @topic
                                                                     7
    return message{ @seal, @payload }
                                                                     8
                                                                     9
define function unseal message
                                                                     10
    with topic
                                                                     11
                                                                     12
as
    Oseal = hash Omessage payload and Otopic
                                                                     13
    if @topic == @seal xor @message seal then // check
                                                                     14
        return @payload
                                                                     15
    return nil
                                                                     16
```

Functions wrap/unwrap transform between message and trojan chunk. wrap takes an optional recipient public key to asymmetrically encrypt the message. The targets are a list of overlay address prefixes derived from overlay addresses of recipients, with length specified to guarantee that a chunk matching it will end up with the recipient solely as a result if push-syncing.

Definition 95 - Wrapping/unwrapping.

```
// /pss
                                                                        1
                                                                     2
define function wrap message
                                                                     3
    for recipient
                                                                     4
    to
        targets
                                                                     5
                                                                     6
as
                                                                     7
    @msg = @message
        (crypto/encrypt for @recipient if @recipient)
                                                                     8
                                                                     9
    Ononce = crypto/mine On such that
                                                                     10
        Otargets any is prefix of
                                                                     11
             trojan{On, Omsg} as chunk address
                                                                     12
    trojan{Ononce, Omsg} as chunk
                                                                     13
                                                                     14
define function unwrap chunk
                                                                     15
    for recipient
                                                                     16
                                                                     17
as
                                                                     18
    @chunk bytes
        (crypto/decrypt for @recipient if @recipient)
                                                                     19
             as message
                                                                     20
```

When a chunk arrives at the node, pss/deliver is called as a hook by the storage component. First the message is unwrapped using the recipient private key and unsealed with all the topics API clients subscribed to. If the unsealing is successful, message integrity as well as topic matching is proven so the payload is written into the stream registered for the topic in question.

Definition 96 – Incoming message handling.

```
// /pss
                                                                       1
                                                                    2
// mailbox is a handler type, expects payload
                                                                    3
// sent sealed with the topic to be delivered via the stream
                                                                    4
define type mailbox
                                                                    5
    topic
                                                                    6
    deliveries stream of [] byte
                                                                    7
                                                                    8
                                                                    9
define context mailboxes as [] mailbox
                                                                    10
define function deliver chunk
                                                                    11
    @msg = @chunk unwrap for context recipient
                                                                    12
```

```
mailboxes each @mailbox
                                                                    13
        @payload = unseal @msg with @mailbox topic
                                                                    14
        if @payload then
                                                                    15
            write @msg payload
                                                                    16
                 to @mailbox deliveries
                                                                    17
Definition 97 – pss API: send.
   // /pss
                                                                       1
                                                                    2
define function send @payload []byte
                                                                    3
    about topic
                                                                    4
    for recipient
                                                                    5
    ?to
                                                                    6
           targets
has api POST on "/pss/<recipient>/<topic>(?targets=<targets>)"
                                                                    7
    with @payload as body
                                                                    8
                                                                    9
as
    targets = lookup.targets for @recipient if no @targets
                                                                    10
    context tag = tag/tag{}
                                                                    11
    seal @payload with @topic
                                      // seal with topic
                                                                    12
        wrap for Orecipient
                                      // encrypt if given
                                                                    13
           recipient
            to @targets
                                      // mine nonce and returns
                                                                    14
               trojan chunk
                 store
                                       // to be sent by push-sync 15
                                       // tag to monitor status
                                                                    16
    return tag
Definition 98 – pss API: receive.
  // /pss
                                                                       1
                                                                    2
define function receive about topic
                                                                    3
    on uint64 @channel
                                                                    4
has api POST on "/pss/subscribe/<topic>(?on=<channel>)"
                                                                    5
                                                                    6
    @stream = open @channel
                                                                    7
    context mailboxes append= mailbox{ @topic, @stream }
                                                                    8
                                                                    9
define function cancel topic
                                                                    10
    on Ochannel uint64
                                                                    11
has api DELETE on "/pss/subscribe/<topic>(?on=<channel>)"
                                                                    12
                                                                    13
```

2.7.3 Envelopes

Definition 99 - Envelope.

```
// /pss

define type envelope
  id [segment size]byte
  sig crypto/signature
  ps postage/stamp

1
2
4
5
6
```

2.7.4 Update notifications

2.7.5 Chunk recovery

Definition 100 - Targeted delivery request.

```
// /targeted.delivery
                                                                        1
                                                                     2
define type envelope
                                                                     3
               segment
                                                                     4
    signature crypto/signature
                                                                     5
                                                                     6
                                                                     7
define function wrap address
                                                                     8
    ?by @key crypto
                                                                     9
    to @targets [] target
                                                                     10
as
                                                                     11
    @key = crypto/random if no @key
                                                                     12
    On = crypto/mine On such that
                                                                     13
        Otargets any is prefix of
                                                                     14
            hash On and Okey account
                                                                     15
    Osig = crypto/sign hash On and Oaddress
                                                                     16
        by @key
                                                                     17
    envelope{ @n, @sig }
                                                                     18
```

Definition 101 – Prod missing chunk notification with recovery request.

 $^{\mathrm{c}}$

```
// /recovery
                                                                    1
                                                                    2
define type request
                                                                    3
    address
                                                                    4
    envelope
                                                                    5
                                                                    6
                                                                    7
define function request address
    with Oresponse bool
                                                                    8
    to @targets
                                                                    9
                                                                    10
as
    @request = request{ @address }
                                                                    11
    if Oresponse then
                                                                    12
        @request envelope =
                                                                    13
            targeted.delivery/wrap @address by @key to @targets 14
    pss/send @request bytes about "RECOVERY" to @targets
                                                                    15
```

Part I

Appendix

Appendix A

Density-based size estimation

Nodes in Swarm must utilise their full reserve capacity: nodes will potentially further replicate chunks in case they have unused reserve capacity beyond storing their share necessary for a system-wide level of redundancy required. To incentivise this, participating in the redistribution game involves a check called *proof of resources* which is supposed to verify the size of reserve from which the reserve samples are generated. The insight here is that the sample is the lowest range of a uniformly random variate over the entire 256-bit address space. Intuitively, the higher the original volume of the sampled set, the denser it is, the lower the expected maximum value in the sample. Conversely, a constraint on the maximum value of the last element in the sample practically puts a minimum cardinality requirement on the sampled set using a solution called *density based set size estimation*.

We are given n independent, uniformly distributed values between 0 and 1.¹ Let the value of the kth smallest of these be x_k (so the smallest of the n values is x_1 , the second smallest is x_2 , and so on, up to x_n). What is the distribution of x_k , given n? And what is the threshold value u such that for any given probability α , the chance of obtaining an x_k lower than u is α ?

Note that the distance between any two adjacent values out of n independent uniform variates follows an exponential distribution, as long as n is sufficiently large.² The rate parameter of this exponential distribution is n + 1, where n is increased by one to account for the fact

 $^{^{1}}$ Because we work with densities, the actual integer range is not relevant and results obtained for the unit interval can simply be rescaled to the Swarm use case by multiplying with 2^{256} .

 $^{^{2}}$ This follows from the fact that n independent uniform variates can be thought of as realizing a Poisson process, whereby the timing of events is random, and it is known that the nearest-neighbour distribution (i.e., waiting time between two consecutive events) is then exponentially distributed.

that the expected gap between adjacent values is 1/(n+1).

We are after the distribution of the kth value, 4 x_k , which then can be thought of as arising from the sum of k independent exponential variables, each with a rate parameter of n+1. This is known to result in an Erlang distribution with shape parameter k and rate parameter n+1. Using $X(\lambda)$ to denote the exponential distribution with rate λ and $E(k,\lambda)$ to denote the Erlang distribution with shape k and rate λ :

$$\sum_{i=1}^{k} X_i(n+1) = E(k, n+1), \tag{A.1}$$

where the subscript i in $X_i(n+1)$ distinguishes between independent exponentially distributed random variables. The probability density function E(x, k, n+1) of the Erlang distribution itself is given by

$$E(x,k,n+1) = \frac{(n+1)^k x^{k-1} e^{-(n+1)x}}{(k-1)!}.$$
(A.2)

This distribution contains the answer to the first question: what is the distribution of the kth smallest value out of n independent uniform variates between 0 and 1? For example, if k = 16 and n is either 500, 750, or 1000, we get the distributions shown in Figure A.1.

We can now answer the second question: given n and a confidence level α , what is the threshold value u for x_k such that the probability that $x_k < u$ is equal to α ? That is, we wish to know the value x = u at which the probability distribution has encompassed a given area of α (see figure A.2).

The area under the curve of the Erlang distribution is given by its cumulative distribution function P(x, k, n + 1), which is known to be

$$P(x,k,n+1) = \int_0^x E(y,k,n+1) \, dy = \frac{1}{(k-1)!} \int_0^{(n+1)x} t^{k-1} e^{-t} \, dt.$$
 (A.3)

The latter expression is sometimes written as $\tilde{\gamma}(k,(n+1)x)$, where

$$\tilde{\gamma}(k,x) = \frac{1}{\Gamma(k)} \int_0^x t^{k-1} e^{-t} dt$$
(A.4)

³For n = 2, the mean outcome is $x_1 = 1/3$ and $x_2 = 2/3$; for n = 3, it is $x_1 = 1/4$, $x_2 = 2/4$, $x_3 = 3/4$; and so on: for arbitrary n, $x_i = i/(n+1)$, with the gap between adjacent values in this ideal case always being 1/(n+1).

⁴An alternative approach using order statistic expresses x_k via a beta distribution. It is very difficult to prove that the Beta distribution's quantile function is a strictly decreasing function of n, which is a key piece of the argument presented here. Although this method is exact even for small n, in our case, n always a very large number, therefore we adopted the other method.




Figure A.1: Probability density function E(x, k, n + 1) of the Erlang distribution, with k = 16 and n either 500, 750, or 1000.




Figure A.2: The distribution of x_{16} , i.e., the 16th smallest value from among n = 500 independently and uniformly drawn variates between 0 and 1. The area under the curve is shaded up to 5% of its area. The point at which the shading stops is therefore the value u for which there is only a 5% chance of getting an even smaller x_{16} .

is the regularized lower incomplete gamma function. We therefore want to solve the equation

$$\alpha = \int_0^u E(y, k, n+1) \, dy = P(u, k, n+1)$$
 (A.5)

for u.

Inverting this expression in u (since the cumulative distribution function increases monotonically in u, the inverse exists) leads to the quantile function $Q(\alpha, k, n + 1)$ of the Erlang distribution: $u = Q(\alpha, k, n + 1)$. The quantile function is known to be expressible as

$$Q(\alpha, k, n+1) = \frac{\tilde{\gamma}^{-1}(k, x)}{n+1},$$
(A.6)

where $\tilde{\gamma}^{-1}(k,x)$ is the inverse regularized lower incomplete gamma function. Its particular form is of no interest to us, except for two properties. First, it is positive for all x.⁵ Second, it is independent of n. Instead, the entire dependence of $Q(\alpha, k, n+1)$ on n is given by the n+1 term in the denominator of Equation A.6. From this, we conclude that $Q(\alpha, k, n+1)$ is a strictly decreasing function of n.

These two points lead to an important consequence. Say we compute the threshold u for a given α and n in order to have an upper bound on a lower quantile. Now, if we were to decrease n but hold all other things equal, the threshold will always get higher than what it was before. The threshold obtained for higher values of n may therefore serve as a conservative estimate of the threshold for lower values: if u is a threshold such that the kth smallest out of n uniform variates is only smaller than u in α of cases, then for any amount m < n, the chance of the kth variate conforming to the same constraint (i.e., $x_k < u$) is now even smaller than α .

Conversely, if we were to constrain x_k so that the probability of not getting a value smaller than u is lower than β (minimising a higher quantile), we find that the constraint remains true as n is increased.

Armed with these results, let us see how Equation A.6 can be used for the estimation procedure. There are two problems to tackle, ultimately relating to the two aspects of a test's accuracy. First, we want to catch inadequate storers slacking on volume. In other words, we want to constrain the x_k values so that we can safely say that any attacker with a stored volume below an acceptable size n has a probability less than α to obtain such a small x_k by pure chance. Construing the condition for $x_k < u$ as a test to filter honest players (just based on the size of their reserve), $1 - \alpha$ expresses the sensitivity of the test. From the previous argument on the monotonic dependence of α on n, it is safe to use a condition that requires x_k to stay below a threshold obtained for n.

Second, we want to avoid situations when honest participants end up not satisfying the above constraint even though they sampled from a set larger than the required minimum. Given a target volume m > n, the error rate of false negatives is guaranteed to be less than

⁵This stands to reason: the quantile function of a distribution on $x \in [0, \infty)$ is itself between 0 and ∞ , and $\tilde{\gamma}^{-1}(k, x)$ is just the quantile function of the Erlang distribution times the positive constant n + 1.

 β obtained from the quantile function with parameters m, k, and u. The quantity $1 - \beta$ is the *specificity* or *precision* of the test.

Figure A.3 illustrates this idea, for two different distributions in both the lower- and upperend estimation. What we want is to choose u to simultaneously make sure that dishonest players do not sneak through the system and also that honest players do not get excluded too often. This translates to make both α and β as small as possible.




Figure A.3: Recall and precision of proof of reserve size validation: Any chosen u will lead to different α and β values, depending on n. Here u is fixed at 0.02. The top panel shows distributions for $x \equiv x_{16}$ with n = 500 (blue) and n = 1000 (yellow). The area left under the blue curve to the left of u is equal to α (blue shade); the area under the yellow curve right of u is equal to β (yellow shade). If the curves overlap considerably (top), it is impossible to choose an u such that α and β are simultaneously small.

One way to try and find the best compromise is by minimising $\alpha + \beta$ (the accuracy of the test) and pick the u value at the optimum to be used in the proof of resources test. To this end, one can vary α between 0 and 1 and, for each of its values, solve the equation $\alpha = Q(1-\beta,k,n+1)$ (where n is the larger value, used for estimating β). This way, we get a β value for every possible α . Then, we can find the combination which minimises $\alpha + \beta$, and determine the value of u that leads to this optimum. As illustrated in figure A.4, larger values of k yield a trade-off curve along which better accuracies can be achieved.




Figure A.4: Optimal accuracy of reserve size probe By increasing k, one can get better optima for minimising $\alpha + \beta$. Here $n = 10^6$ for estimating α and $2 \cdot 10^6$ for estimating β , and k is either 8, 16, or 32 (colors). The values of u associated with the optima are also shown.

Table A.1 summarizes the important numerical results in Figure A.4.⁶

\overline{k}	α	β	u	$u \cdot 2^{256}$
8	0.196216	0.1373622	$5.54589 \cdot 10^{-6}$	$6.421705 \cdot 10^{71}$
16	0.097612	0.0716570	$1.10923 \cdot 10^{-5}$	$1.284401 \cdot 10^{72}$
32	0.029386	0.0219151	$2.21962 \cdot 10^{-5}$	$2.570140 \cdot 10^{72}$

Table A.1: Proof of density parameter calibration. Assuming $n = 10^6$ and $m = 2 \cdot 10^6$ to calculate recall and precision error rates α and β , respectively, the cutoff value for the proof is calibrated by optimizing on accouracy using sample sizes 8, 16, 32.

⁶Since the hash function used to generate random variates does so in the range $[0, 2^{256} - 1]$ instead of [0, 1], the calculated thresholds are scaled with 2^{256} to show where they would fall in their actual range.

Appendix B

Source of randomness

As the neighbourhood selection anchor will directly affect which neighbourhood wins the pot, it is prudent to derive the randomness from a source of entropy that cannot be manipulated. A common solution to obtain randomness is to have independent parties committing to a random nonce with a stake. The random seed for a round is defined as the xor of all revealed nonces. Given the nonces are independent sources fixed in the commit, no individual participant has the ability to skew randomness by selecting a particular nonce. Thanks to the commutativity of xor, the order of reveals is also irrelevant. However, if the reveal transactions are sequential, committers compete at holding out since the last one to reveal can effectively choose the resulting seed to be either including its committed nonce (if they do reveal) or not (if they do not reveal). The threat to slash the stake of non-revealers serves to eliminate this degree of freedom from last revealers and thus renders this scheme a secure random oracle assuming there is at least one honest (non-colluding) party.¹

Now note that the redistribution scheme already has a commit reveal scheme as well as stake slashed for non-revealers, so a potential random oracle is already part of the proposed scheme. Incidentally, the beginning of the claim phase is when new randomness is needed to select the truth and a winner. Importantly, these random values are only needed if there is a claim which implies that there were some commits and reveals to choose from. Or conversely, if there are no reveals in the round,² the random seed is undefined but is also not needed for the claim.

The random seed that transpires at the beginning of the claim phase can serve as the reserve

¹If the stake is higher than the reward pot, one cannot afford being slashed with even just one commit without a loss. If this cannot be guaranteed, slashing of the stake is not an effective deterrent.

²If saboteurs get slashed or frozen in the claim transaction, if there is no claim, the committers get away without being punished. This can be remedied if the staking contract keeps a flag on each overlay (set when commits, unsets when reveals in the same round) and the check and punishment happens as a result of a commit call in the case the flag is found set.

sample salt (nonce input to modified hash used in the sampling) with which the nodes in the selected neighbourhood can start calculating their reserve sample.

The neighbourhood for the next round is selected by the neighbourhood selection anchor, which is, similarly to the truth and winner selection nonces, deterministically derived from the same random seed. Unlike the nonces used to select from the reveals, neighbourhood selection should be well defined for the following round even if a round is skipped, i.e., when there is no reveals. To cover this case skipped rounds keep the random seed of the previous round. However, in order to rotate selected neighbourhoods through skipped rounds, we derive the neighbourhood selection anchor from the seed by factoring in the number of game rounds passed since the last reveal.³

In order to provide protection against the case when each committer in the neighbourhood is colluding, and can afford losing stake we need to make sure that the entropy is still high otherwise the nodes can influence the neighbourhood selection nonce and reselect themselves or a fixed colluding neighbourhood (or increase the chances of reselection).

Definition 103 – Random seed for the round.

Define the random seed of the round as the xor of all obfuscation keys sent as part of the reveal transaction data during the entire reveal period:

$$\mathcal{R} : \Gamma \mapsto Nonce$$
 (B.1)

$$\mathcal{R}(\gamma) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} \mathcal{R}(Prev(\gamma)) & \text{if } |Reveals(\gamma)| = 0\\ \bigvee_{r \in Reveals(\gamma)} \text{NONCE}(r) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$
(B.2)

Lemma 104 - Round seed is a secure random oracle.

The nonce produced by xoring the revealed obfuscation keys is a correct source of entropy.

Proof. Assuming n independent parties committing, choosing any particular nonce will leave the outcome fully random.

³Otherwise a selected neighbourhood could collude maliciously not to commit/reveal and have the pot roll over to the following round. By simply holding out for a number of redistribution rounds, they could unfairly multiply their reward when they eventually claim the pot.

Appendix C

Parameter constants

Table C.1 lists the constants used by Swarm with their type, default value and description.

CONSTANT NAME	TYPE	VALUE	DESCRIPTION
BZZ_NETWORK_ID	uint64	0	ID of the swarm network
PHASE_LENGTH	uint64	38	length of commit phase of the redistribu-
			tion game round in number of blocks
ROUND_LENGTH	uint64	152	length of one redistribution game round
			in number of blocks, fixed at 4 times the PHASE LENGTH
NODE_RESERVE_DEPTH	uint8	23	size requirement for client reserve capac-
110001111111111111111111111111111111111	arreco	20	ity given in base 2 log number of chunks
SAMPLE_DEPTH	uint8	4	base 2 log number of chunks in sample
MAX_SAMPLE_VALUE	uint256	$1.2844 \cdot 10^{72}$	maximum value for last transformed ad-
			dress in reserve sample, i.e., $< 1\%$ chance
			the sampled set size is below a fourth of
MINIMUM OTAKE	1050	10	the prescribed node reserve size.
MINIMUM_STAKE	uint256	10	minimum stake amount in BZZ to be redefined as minimum stake given in stor-
			age rent units
MIN_STAKE_AGE	uint256	228	minimum number of blocks stakers need
			to wait after update or creation for the
			stake to be useable. Defaults to one and
			a half rounds to prevent opportunistic
			manipulation of stake after a neighbour-
			hood is selected.

PRICE_2X_ROUNDS	uint64	64	number of rounds it takes for the price
			to double in the presence of a consistent
			lowest degree signal of undersupply.
NHOOD_PEER_COUNT	uint8	4	minimum number of nodes required to
			form a fully connected neighbourhood.

Table C.1: Parameter constants